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The Twenty-Third Annual Department of Defense Cost Analysis Symposium was held in
Leesburg, Virginia, on 6-8 September 1989. A number of the papers presented at that
symposium, as well as a roundtable discussion held at the symposium, were analyses of the
costs associated with alternative competition strategies in weapon system acquisition. The papers
and the transcript of the roundtable discussion included in this compendium were selected from
those presented at the symposium which addressed the general area of weapon system
competition. The papers and discussion fall into three broad areas addressing the costs and
benefits of competition: methodological analyses, empirical analyses, and analyses of policy and
implementation. They represent those efforts which best reflect state-of-the-art research into the
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The Twenty-Third Annual Department of Defense Cost Analysis Symposium was held in
Leesburg, Virginia, on 6-8 September 1989. A number of the papers presented at that
symposium, as well as a roundtable discussion held at the symposium, were analyses of the
costs associated with alternative competition strategies in weapon system acquisition.
Competition, as the term is used in the field of weapon system acquisition, refers to the presence
of more than one, but usually only two, contractors, or sources, for the development or
production of a weapon system. The introduction of a second source for development or
production is referred to as dual sourcing.
The issue of whether to compete, or more specifically, to dual source particular weapon
systems at specific stages in their acquisition lifetimes is an important one. There are advantages
and disadvantages associated with competing the various acquisition stages of a weapon system
when compared with having only a single contracting source provide all stages of acquisition.
If the acquisition is competed, advantages which may be realized are lower life cycle (or at least
acquisition) cost, better peiormance, and an ace elerated production schedule for the weapon
system. On the other hand, there are disadvantages, usually realized as costs that may be
substantial, associated with setting up the second source. These ramifications are discussed in
detail by the papers in this volume.
The papers and the transcript of the roundtable discussion included in this compendium
were selected from those presented at the symposium which addressed the general area of
weapon system competition. They represent those efforts which best reflect state-of-the-art
research into the issues surrounding the costs associated with alternative strategies for weapon
system competition. Synopses of the papers and the discussion are in the following section of
this chapter. The papers and transcript of the discussion appear in succeeding chapters.
The papers and discussion fall into three broad areas addressing the costs and benefits
of competition: methodological analyses, empirical analyses, and analyses of policy and
implementation. At the methodological level, the paper by Boger, Greer, and Liao and the paper
by Beltramo address issues which lie at the root of all analyses of competition in weapon system
acquisition. In the second area, empirical analyses of the effects of competition in production are
provided by Tyson and by Flynn and Herrin. An empirical analysis of the effects of competition
during the development stage is presented by Dembroski and Bohn. The thii d area, competition
policy and implementation in defense acquisition, is addressed by the roundtable discussion of
Carlson, Hamre, and McNicol which was moderated by Nussbaum.
2. SYNOPSES
Boger, Greer and Liao
Following a great deal of publicity concerning defense procurement scandals in the early
1980s, Congress enacted the Competition In Contracting Act of 1984 in an attempt to open
defense acquisition to more competition. This paper attempts to separate the myths from the
facts of weapon system competition. It is unfortunate that many policy analyses, as well as many
major acquisition decisions, have been based on the myth that competing weapon systems will
always produce significant savings to the government. The fact is that dual source competition
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i major systems introduced prior to the mid-1 980 's has resulted in additional costs to the
overnment almost as often as it has produced savings. The paper provides a discussion of
ontractor forward-pricing strategies, in general, as well as a detailed examination of several of
e deficiencies associated with dual sourcing when used as an approximation to competition.
Jeltramo
This paper identifies and discusses data and analytical methods used to evaluate the
economic effects of production competition. It shows that there exist significant problems
concerning the current state of data used to assess the efficacy of dual sourcing. The paper
discusses the usual, baseline technique of measuring the effects of competition as well as
alternative techniques, and it points out that all methodologies have deficiencies. A problem
common to all approaches is that they focus on individual programs instead of the overall
profitability and sustainability of the entire firm. Given the current policy thrust toward joint-
ventured or teamed development programs, conclusions about the economic effects of
competition using any of the discussed assessment technique must be carefully drawn, and those
conclusions remain case-sensitive in nature.
Tyson
After reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of competition in weapon system
acquisition, this paper presents a standard method for evaluating the impact of production
competition on program costs. Typical applications are then dscussed. The paper then presents
the results of case studies of cost and schedule outcomes of 64 major programs of which 1 3 are
competitive. In addition to the case studies, several other studies of dual-sourced programs are
reviewed.
The principal results of the analyses are, first, that there is no statistically significant
difference in cost growth between competitive and non-competitive acquisitions and, second, that
cost growth under competition is actually higher than under sole source procurement.
Additionally, the analyses show that production quantity growth is much higher and program
stretchout is much lower under competition. This may indicate either that stable programs are
chosen for competition or that the government keeps competitive programs more stable in an
attempt to recoup its investment in the second source. Detailed findings and conclusions are also
presented.
Ffynn and Herrin
This paper presents the results of an analysis of the costs of dual sourcing twelve major
Navy programs. After explaining the methods and assumptions made in the study, the authors
present their results both in terms of estimated net savings due to dual sourcing and in terms of
price changes of both the original and second sources observed over time. Using two scenarios
which vary the times over which the government can recoup its investment in the second source,
the authors find estimated net savings of 1 4% through fiscal year 1 994 and estimated net savings
of 12% through fiscal year 1989 totaled across the twelve programs. All twelve programs show
net savings in the longer run scenario, while eight programs show net savings in the shorter
scenario. The net savings are dollar weighted, so that larger dollar savings are more important
in the final net savings figures.
In comparing the pricing behavior found in dual sourcing over time, the authors find that
competition between the first and second sources appears to intensify over time. They also find
that the application of downward rotations to learning curves due to the effects of competition
may be inappropriate. They further find that the pricing behavior of the second source largely
etermines the savings outcome of the competition; when the second source fails to beat the
rice of the first source, savings tend to be small, and conversely.
embroskl and Bohn
This paper presents the initial results of a study to determine the effects of competition
luring the development stage of the acquisition of major weapon systems. Prototype
ompetition, advanced development competition, and competitive fly-offs of alternative systems
ire examined. Although there is limited historical experience in the use of development
competition in major weapon system acquisition, this study identifies evidence of a reduction in
>roduction unit cost growth and/or increases in quality, producibility, and contractor
esponsiveness for programs using development competition. The extent of these effects
depends upon the selection criteria used during the contractor selection process. Thus, the use
3f competition during development is found to motivate the contractor to respond to the
bjectives that appear important to the government. This indicates that a successful development
ompetition must begin with a clear indentification of the government's priorities.
Roundtable Discussion
In a wide-ranging discussion of competition policy and implementation in the Department
of Defense, the roundtable begins with an assessment of the adequacy of both data and analysis
for determining the effects of competition. The implications of this adequacy for various parties'
overall assessments of the efficacy of competition are also pursued. The dircussionthen focuses
on the determination of which particular weapon systems may be more attractive for dual
sourcing. Switching to an assessment of alternative acquisition strategies encompassing dual
sourcing, the discussants evaluate the strategy of having two contractors team during
development followed by their competing during prodution. The discussion then turns to the
question of whether economic goals are the most important during dual sourcing. The roundtable
ends by addressing the future of dual sourcing in the Department of Defense.
s








After publicity concerning $640 toilet covers, $436 hammers and other procurement
problems, the Executive, the Congress, and the general public began pushing to open defense
acquisition to more competition. As a result, Congress enacted the Competition in Contracting
Act of 1984, Public Law 98-369 Due to this strong legislative and political pressure. "Think
Competition" has become a slogan in defense acquisition circles, and dual source procurement
has been suggested as one means of obtaining additional competition.
The purpose of this paper is to separate myths from facts in weapon system competition.
It is unfortunate that many policy analyses, and many major acquisition decisions, were based
on the myth that competing weapon systems would produce significant savings to the
government.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the pressure faced by the
Department of Defense (DoD) to increase the use of competition in procurement. Section 2
discusses the unique DoD market environment, while Section 3 reviews prior studies which
demonstrate the paradox that competition has resulted in added net costs to the government as
often as it has produced the desired net saving. Sections 4 and 5 present some theoretical and
empirical data that explain the paradoxical findings. Section 6 summarizes myths and facts in
weapon system competition and concludes with directions for future study for acquisition policy
1. COMPETITION IN DEFENSE ACQUISITION
There is a deep-seated and historic belief that the best model for government procurement
.
is solicitation of price offers from a maximum number of qualified sources. Indeed, there are :,
many advantages to the government of competitive procurement if it is applied properly. Various
imperatives for competition in defense procurement will be discussed in this section.
Since 1 809, Federal statutes, regulations, and executive orders have consistently required
that government procurement must, to the greatest possible extent, be made on a competitive
basis. In 1965, then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara indicated to the Joint Economic
Committee (Hearings on the Economic Impact of Federal Procurement) that the General
Accounting Office (GAO) had evidence of dollar savings on the order of 25 percent or more when
competition was introduced for reprocurement of an item which had a sole-source procurement
history [1]. Since then, this 25 percent savings figure has been quoted repeatedly by defense
policy makers and observers. In 1969, the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in
Government of the Joint Economic Committee called for vastly expanded use of competition for
procuring all forms of Defense Department material [2].
This position has been reaffirmed both by the current Administration and by Congress.
The most recent legislation is Public Law 98-369, which includes the Competition in Contracting
Act of 1984. PL 98-369 stipulates the use of dual sourcing by DoD and civil agencies in
procurement. The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (a.k.a., the
Packard Commission) also strongly advocated the increased use of competition [3], This drive
8
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Dward competitive procurement is reflected in various internal DoD initiatives and programs.
2. DEFENSE MARKETS
Defense markets run the gamut from totally free competition to a DoD-created market with
3ne buyer and one or two suppliers; from markets which provide many choices of product and
Droduct attributes to one in which a product exists only because the DoD has paid the price to
reate it. While a great majority of the 13 million annual procurement actions are conducted in
a purely competitive fashion, the majority of defense procurement dollars have been spent in a
market where the government is the only buyer and the number of potential suppliers is small.
n FY 1985, noncompetitive contracts awarded by DoD totaled $96 billion (underline in original)
[4].
Competition in traditional markets arises when buyers and sellers are numerous and
individually so unimportant in the market that their separate actions have no meaningful impact
on market price. A great majority of DoD procurement actions are in such a market. However.
the majority of procurement dollars are for major weapon systems which poses a unique problem.
For major systems, the government is the only buyer. It dictates the size of the market
and the timing of demand. Additionally, these systems usually involve state-of-the-art technologies,
and hence bear little relation to the infamous ubiquitous "widget" which is produced and sold in
traditional competitive markets. Compounding these uncertainties to the supplier is the heavy
investment needed to become a supplier. In this kind of environment, the availability of suppliers
may be Inked to the willingness of the government to absorb at least part of the risk, which could
mean that the government must incur investment cost to develop a supplier in order to introduce
a competitor. This is an element which is unique to the major defense systems market and is not
well understood by those unfamiliar with the defense market Lack of understanding of the
uniqueness of the defense market contributes to the illusion that competition in defense
acquisition always produces lower prices to the government.
3. GAINS AND LOSSES FROM PRIOR DUAL SOURCE COMPETITION
Since McNamara 's statement about the 25 percent savings from introducing a competitor
numerous studies have been conducted to examine the financial consequences of dual source
competition. Earlier studies, with questionable methodologies, reported dramatic savings from
introducing a competitor. These earlier studies are discussed elsewhere [6 through 9]. Despite
their questionable methodologies, these studies were prominently cited as evidence of savings
from introducing competition to weapon systems; Cohen [5] is an example. With the
improvement in research methodologies, studies conducted in recent years revealed that
competition has resulted in added net costs almost as often as it has produced the desired net
savings. A comprehensive survey of prior studies can be found in the literature[6, 7, and 8] and,
therefore, will not be repeated here. We will pursue the contradictory findings and provide
additional insight concerning the inconsistencies.
Although many dual-sourced weapon systems programs have been studied, we will
examine only those with verifiable data. Our interests are not on predicting the size of dollar
savings but on pursuing the paradoxical finding that dual source competition has resulted in
added costs as well as net savings. Hopefully, these efforts will provide some leads for the
direction of future policy analysis.
Table 1 lists seven t.lual-sourced programs which have been examined closely in several
studies [9 and 10]. The program savings (losses) data were taken from earlier studies, and the
amount of savings (losses) was calculated by comparing actual prices paid by the government
after the program was dual sourced to the amount that would have been paid had the
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Table 1
Relationship Between Savings and Economic Environment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Savings or Time Period Average Capacity
Procurement (Loss) Due to in Dual Utilization During
Program Competition 3 Source Phase Dual Source Phase
TOW Missile 26.0% 1971-75 63.5%
Rockeye Bomb 25.5 1972-73 70.9
Bullpup AGM-12B 18.7 1961-64 76.2
Shillelagh Missile (4.7) 1 968-69 87.0
Sparrow AIM-7F (25.0) 1977-80 81.6
MK-46 Torpedo (30.9) 1 966-69 91.6
Sidewinder AIM-9D/G (71.3) 1963-71 82.3
'From Beltramo and Jordan [9]
government continued sole source procurement.
We examined the time period during which each program was in the dual source
competition mode, as shown in Column (3). The aerospace industry's capacity utilization rate
during the dual source phase of each program is shown in Column (4). Note that the three
programs realizing savings from dual sourcing were in the dual source procurement phase when
the aerospace industry's capacity utilization rates were relatively low. On the other hand, the
other four programs, which resulted in losses, were in the dual source procurement phase when
the industry's capacity utilization rates were relatively high. It should be apparent to the reader
that the likelihood of realizing savings or suffering losses from dual sourcing a major weapon
system is related to the business environment of the industry.
Figure 1 shows the same data in chronological order. From a historical perspective, the
three dual-sourced programs which resulted in saving to the government (Bullpup, TOW,
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the other hand, dual sourcing Sidewinder, MK-46, and Shillelagh resulted in additional cost to the
government because they coincided with the height of the Vietnam war when the aerospace and
the ordnance industries were at their busiest since WW II. It is clear th-t creating a second
source as the "competitive" supplier does not always result in a competitive environment in an
economic sense. Whether or not the government can realize the benefit of competition depends
on the timing of dual sourcing. In the next two sections, we will provide additional insight to
illuminate this point.
4. CONTTRACTORS' FORWARD-PRICING STRATEGIES
The analysis in the preceding section suggests that contractors adjust their bid prices
according to the business environment of their industry. Given the multitude of laws and
regulations governing the government contractors' cost accounting and pricing, one might
12
onder how it is indeed possible to have varying levels of prices. To understand why this is
ossible, it is necessary to understand the forward-pricing system used in defense and other
irge civilian contracts.
Under the forward-pricing system, a bid price must be submitted well in advance on the
ften highly uncertain estimated cost to perform the contracted work. The uncertainty factor is
particularly serious for defense contracts, since most involve state-of-the-art technologies. When
ie industry has ample idle capacity, such as in a post-war era, a firm may be so eager to
'ompete for a contract that it will base its bid on an estimated cost figure which it may only have
small chance of achieving. Figure 2 depicts this decision scenario. This hypothetical example
ssumes that the estimated cost to complete a contract ranges from the highly optimistic $50,000
only 0.5% chance of achieving this cost figure) to the worst case scenario of $1 50,000. The top
rame shows the estimated probability of occurrence of each cost figure. The bottom frame
shows the cumulative probability of. or the chance to equal or better, a particular cost level.
Point A in the bottom frame of Figure 2 shows the estimated cost if the contractor is willing
to accept a 50:50 chance. The corresponding cost estimate for the contract is approximately
$98,000. The contractor may add another 1 0% as his profit target and submit a bid of $1 07,800
in the hope of winning the contract.
On the other hand, the contractors do not face any pressure to submit a competitive bids
if business conditions in the industry improve and each firm has ample business opportunities.
There are several reasons for this. For one, during an economic boom, a profit making firm is
less likely to engage in price competition. This reduced willingness to compete in price would
be further compounded if a contractor senses that other potential contractors also share this
reduced willingness to compete. A booming economy also implies alternatives for the firm's
production capacity. Sufficient profit opportunity must exist in order to justify capacity expansion,
13
Figure 2








id, before the capacity can be expanded and made operational, existing projects must compete
ith each other for the limited capacity. Under all these circumstances, a contractor will not
jbmlt a bid unless he/she is highly confident that the estimated cost level can be equaled or
ttered.
If the contractor desires a higher confidence level, say 75%, the estimated cost would be
pproximately $1 1 0,000, as shown in Point B in Figure 2. Adding a 1 0% profit target would bring
le bid price to $1 21 ,000, a much higher bid compared to the $1 07,800 when the economy is not
s good. Therefore, there is a close association between a contractor's bid price and the
ondition of the economy. This deduction is consistent with the empirical observation made in
he preceding section that the potential for the government to realize the benefit of weapon
system competition depends on the timing of dual sourcing.
5. STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCY OF DUAL SOURCE COMPETITION
Apart from the timing issue discussed above, there is a structural deficiency in the way a
major weapon system can be procured competitively. Dual source competition allows the
contractor and the government opportunities to exploit the market situation to the advantage of
each party. The government's objective, as reflected in PL 98-369 and other policy directives
cited earlier, is that competition will put competitive pressure on the supplier and result in a fair
price to both parties. However, dual source competition also creates opportunities for the
contractor to exploit. First, in return for the competitive market pressure with competitive bidding,
the government gives up much of the regulatory authority it enjoys over verification of the
contractor's cost and pricing data. Thus, it becomes easier for the contractor to obtain higher
profits under a dual source competitive contract than under a sole source negotiated contract if
the market environment allows it. Second, in order to maintain two sources of supply, it is
15
necessary for the government to award a minimum sustaining quantity to the higher-priced
competitor. Both of these factors put the government in a disadvantaged position in dealing with
the contractors. In this section, we will discuss various pricing strategies that can be used by the
contractor to exploit the dual source competition situation. For a detailed discussion of these
strategies, see Boger and Liao [11].
The Minimum Sustaining Rate
In a dual source competition environment, the lower-priced bidder is typically awarded the
major portion of the annual quantity, but the higher bidder is also awarded a quantity that
represents the minimum level of production the contractor requires to stay in production and
remain viable. This guarantee, resulting from the government's desire to maintain two viable
production sources, actually diminishes competitive pressures and puts the government in a
disadvantaged position. Hence, there is no competitive incentive for the suppliers at the minimum
sustaining quantity level, and the government can expect an inflated bid price from both of the
suppliers at this level.
The Production Rate Effect
Due to the splitting of the production quantity between the two contractors, the
government must forego some of the savings associated with cumulative production experience.
The smaller production rate also means higher unit cost because neither contractor is able to fully
realize the economies of scale in production. Therefore, the split award should result in higher
production costs to either of the two contractors than if the entire year s production were awarded
to the low bidder. The argument for using dual source competition, of course, rests on the
assumption that the loss of economies of scale and cumulative production experience should be
16
nore than offset by the smaller amount of profit the contractor would be forced to accept under
:ompetltion. Therefore, it is usually suggested that the bid prices should be lower under a
competitive environment, compared to a sole source acquisition, thus resulting in net savings to
he government.
Jnequal Competitive Position Between Contractors
If the second supplier is established after the first supplier has had some production
experience with the weapon system in question, the competitive position of the two contractors
most likely will be unequal. Under this circumstance, the anticipated competitive pressure from
dual sourcing may diminish, or even evaporate completely.
First of all, being the developer of the system and having had some production
experience, the first supplier often enjoys a cost advantage over the new supplier. Other things
being equal, the more experienced producer will have a lower production cost and can underbid
the new supplier. This problem is compounded if the first supplier continues to win the majority
of annual quantities in a dual award environment.
Second, there is a dilemma facing the government in establishing the second supply
source. Being the only buyer in the major weapon system market, the government often has to
provide financial resources to induce other contractors to establish the production facility for a
particular weapon system. Expanding the capacity beyond the level needed clearly is not
economical. But the combined production capacity of the two firms may far exceed the actual
requirements if the second source is established at the same production capacity level as the
original source. On the other hand, if the second source's production capacity is established at
a level lower than the total government requirement, the second source would not be in a position
to bid at the higher percentages of the annual requirement, thus creating a virtual monopoly for
17
the original source at higher quantities.
Evidence of Contractor Price Gaming
The various scenarios discussed in this section reflect the structural deficiency of dual
source competition, which presents many opportunities for contractors to submit inflated bid
prices. This hypothesis is consistent with the forward-pricing strategy discussed earlier in
providing the explanation for the paradoxical results of prior dual sourcing experience. To
support our logical hypothesis, we will present an actual case which reflects the price gaming
hypothesis discussed above.
Figure 3 shows the bid prices submitted by a contractor of a major weapon systems
under the dual source competition environment. We have masked the i^ntity of the program
and contractor and the numerical values of the data in order to protect the proprietary information,
but the relative scale of all prices is accurate.
The circle on the left in Figure 3 is the actual unit price awarded when the contractor was
the sole source supplier. The dashed line going through this circle and ex; ending downward to
the right is the projected sole source price using the contractor s historical price-reduction curve.
In dual source competition, the government annually solicits bids from both suppliers for
various quantity levels. The lower price bidder is awarded the larger share of the government's
annual quantity requirements while the higher price bidder gets the smaller share, usually the
minimum sustaining rate to keep the loser 's plant active. The stars on the solid line represent the
bid prices for the respective quantity levels (from 20% to 80% of total annual quantity at 10%
increments, also known as the step-ladder bids) submitted by the contractor in the first year of
dual source procurement. The triangles represent the second year bids.
For comparison, the dotted lines beneath the bid price curves represent the reasonable
18
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step-ladder bids. On a log-log graph such as Figure 3, these bids should form a downward
sloping straight line to reflect the production rate economies for larger quantities. The dotted line
should also intercept the dashed long-term price reduction curve to reflect the effect of learning
from cumulative production experience. Comparing the step-ladder bids to the respective
reference line, one can observe several irregularities in those annual bids.
First, at the minimum sustaining rate (20%) level, the bids for both Year 1 and Year 2 are
far above the reasonable bid line, indicating that the bid prices are too high at this quantity level.
This reflects the point made earlier that, at the minimum sustaining rate level, there is no
competitive pressure whatsoever and, no matter who wins the larger share, the other contractor
will be a "happy loser."
Second, the bid prices went up for the 70% and 80% quantity levels. As the reasonable
bid price curves show, the higher the quantity produced, the lower the unit price should be.
19
Increasing the bids at high quantity levels is not economically justifiable and reflects the point
made earlier that, if one contractor senses no competitive pressure from the other side at that
quantity level, it can and will take advantage of the situation.
Another irregularity is that Year 2 bid prices were higher than those in Year 1 . Since the
data have been adjusted for inflation, it is reasonable to expect decreasing prices for subsequent
years because of the learning curve phenomenon typical in the aerospace industry. These
increasing prices are another example of price gaming which is made possible under dual source
"competition".
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Due to the unique market structure, procurement of major defense systems until recently
was done primarily on a sole source basis. Current policy calls for expanded competition in
procuring all forms of defense systems and material. Dual source competition has been
suggested as one means of obtaining competition in the major system procurement. However,
extensive study of prior dual source competition experiences indicates that the results from this
form of competition have been mixed.
In this paper, we have provided some conceptual and empirical explanations for these
paradoxical findings. Our attempt is to separate the myths from the facts of major weapon
system competition:
Myth: Dual source procurement is a competitive procurement.
Fact: In economic theory, competitor implies that there is a large number of suppliers
and an individual supplier's action has no significant impact on the market. Dual source
procurement is a classic case of duopoly which is, in fact, much closer to monopoly than to
competition.
20
Myth: Dual source "competition" will force the suppliers to reduce their prices.
Fact: The primary condition under which the two suppliers in a defense industry duopoly
*/ould engage in price competition is when both are hungry for business, i.e., when the industry
3 in a slump. Even in this case, both suppliers can inflate the bid price at the minimum quantity
Ithout any penalty. Thus, at the minimum sustaining rate under the dual source procurement
structure will always produce a "happy loser."
Myth: Dual sourcing a previously sole-sourced weapon system can produce savings on
he order of 25% or more.
Fact: This myth was the direct result of McNamaras comment and has been quoted
repeatedly by Washington decision makers in the past two decades. It is possible that this figure
may be valid for a particular program, but there are many counter-examples. The size of savings
and losses from dual sourcing varies. The fact is that the government must pay for introducing
a second supply source in the form of initial investment, loss of economies of scale, and inflated
prices for the minimum sustaining rate. Therefore, whether or not the government can realize
savings from dual sourcing a major weapon system depends on the economic condition of the
aerospace and ordnance industries. If the suppliers do engage in price competition, savings from
the lower prices must be larger than the price the government paid for introducing the second
source.
Understanding the myths and facts of major weapon system procurement is crucial in
setting acquisition policies. Under a competitive bidding environment, as currently assumed by
dual source procurement policy, the contractor can charge what the market will bear. On the
other hand, under a monopoly environment, the contractor must substantiate all cost figures.
Since dual source procurement is in reality closer to monopoly than to competition, regulations
must be modified to eliminate those structural deficiencies of the current system.
21
In addition to separating myths from facts, our analyses of dual source competition policy
also provide additional insights into contractors' pricing decision processes. We believe that
these additional insights can shed some light on the direction of future policy studies. Clearly,
the numerous attempts by the government to develop a method to quantify potential savings (as
opposed to potential savings as well as losses) from dual source competition were misdirected.
Our analysis shows that it is possible to determine the optimal timing to introduce a second
source (or not to introduce it at all), but it would be futile to assume only savings result and then
attempt to estimate the size of potential savings.
We believe that future policy research should focus on other viable alternatives to enhance
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ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPETITION
Michael N. Beltramo
Beltramo and Associates, Inc.
About three decades ago Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara endorsed the cost
saving attributes of competition in defense procurement. He also set a standard of 25 percent
for expected savings. A large body of research has since attempted to confirm or contradict his
dictum. Many estimates of added costs or savings due to competition have resulted. Those
estimates result from a posteriori assessments about what an item wo'.,'1 have cost without
competition.
This paper identifies and discusses analytical methods used to evaluate the economic
effects of production competition. It does not promote one over another, rather it shows that all
methodologies have serious deficiencies. Therefore, conclusions about the sconomic effects of
competition must be carefully drawn and are case sensitive in nature.
1 . WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO DO?
Most competitive programs have followed a period of sole source production. Many have
been analyzed to determine the economic effects of competition. Several methodologies have
been employed for this purpose but most follow similar steps. They are:
• Obtain historical cost data including
Nonrecurring costs to establish competition.
Initial (sole) source recurring production costs.
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Competitive production costs for both sources.
• Estimate the sole source cost for the competed quantity.
• Compare the actual competitive cost (including nonrecurring and marginal
recurring costs) with the hypothetical sole source cost.
• Determine the effect of competition on procurement cost.
However, these methods differ regarding their estimates of the sole source cost and the explicit
and implicit assumptions they incorporate. In addition, there are often discrepancies and
uncertainties about the content and nature of the available data. Both of these issues are
discussed below.
2. PROBLEMS WITH NONRECURRING COST DATA AND THEIR TREATMENT
Problems with available data cut across all analytical methodologies. Furthermore, they
underscore differences between a competitive environment (including one where competition is
threatened) and a sole source atmosphere.
Industry often allocates nonrecurring costs to establish a second source. These costs are
expended for: technology transfer, additional tooling and test equipment required by the second
source, and educational units produced to qualify the second source. In addition, the govern-
ment generally needs additional staff to oversee the establishment of a second source.
The identification of all nonrecurring costs would seem to be a straightforward task. But
that is not the case. Government does not record and track its costs related to selecting,
qualifying, and managing a second source. Furthermore, the initial source often receives
additional contract awards to assist with engineering problems experienced by the second source
after competition has begun. Failure to identify these expenditures understates nonrecurring
costs.
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This raises the important issue of the difference in content between sole source and
competitive production contracts. Sole source production contracts normally include funds for
related engineering and technical support services as well as for the required hardware items.
These additional costs are often reflected in the sole source baseline but are missing from
competitive contracts, since they are often funded under a separate contract with the developer.
Thus, an apples and oranges problem exists when extrapolating a sole source contract cost that
includes services in addition to hardware and comparing the result to competitive contracts for
hardware only.
Claims against the government filed and won by disgruntled second sources are another
nonrecurring cost element. In effect, some means of implementing competition have provided
second sources with an insurance policy. Specifically, second sources may recover overruns
caused by optimistic fixed price bids by blaming an allegedly defective technical data package.
There is no systematic procedure for tracking and recording such claims. But they are a nonre-
curring cost of competition.
Data are also subject to different interpretations. For example, the lot at which competition
began may be an issue. There is disagreement about whether competition for the Sparrow AIM-
7F Missile began at Lot 3 or Lot 5 (i.e., whether it began when Raytheon-the initial source-
expected it to or when General Dynamics actually bid for a competitive quantity). The Lot 3
assumption indicates an estimated savings while the Lot 5 assumption shows a higher cost as
a result of competition.
In addition to the identification and interpretation of data, methodologies for making
required economic adjustments are also subject to error. Most analysts agree that a suitable
discount rate is appropriate for reflecting the time value of money. Yet even skilled practitioners
have had difficulty applying this principle. For example, a recent DoD Inspector General report
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stated: "Adjustments should be made for the time value of money because several years may
elapse between the time 'up front' investments are made and the time when the second source
[an effectively compete." [1 ] Yet in adjusting for the time value of money, they used a 1 0% factor
ather than a rate to assess costs of several competitive programs. This failure to apply its
_tipulated methodology correctly caused a substantial understatement of nonrecurring costs. [1 ]
The treatment of low rate initial production (LRIP) units for the sole source has also caused
problems. Second source LRIP usually constitutes an educational buy. The difference between
that price and the current sole source price for the same quantity is treated as either a debit or
credit in calculating nonrecurring costs. Specifically, are these costs part of development cost
or should they be incorporated into the learning curve? A reasonable convention is to count them
as production units if they were produced by hard tooling or if they became operational, as
opposed to test, units. This is more than an academic issue, because those units are often
relatively expensive and, as a consequence, their omission may significantly change the sole
source cost profile.
3. PROBLEMS WITH ESTIMATING SOLE SOURCE RECURRING PRODUCTION COSTS
The Baseline
The Institute for Defense Analysis developed the baseline methodology for estimating the
effects of competition on recurring production costs in 1974 [2]. This methodology consists of
extrapolating the sole source learn ng curve as the basis for estimating the sole source cost for
producing the entire competitive quantity. The difference between the actual and estimated costs
is attributed to competition as either an added cost or savings.
This methodology is commendable for its simplicity which allows competitive programs
with more than one initial sole source lot to be measured by the same yardstick. But this
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simplicity has exposed it to criticism that its results are misleading because it neglects important
factors.
Many factors influence the slope of learning curves. They include, among others: changes
in production rate, tooling, capital equipment and facilities, and product design as well as
management strategy. However, learning curves conceal the individual effects of these factors
by lumping them all together.
Critics of the baseline methodology have focused primarily on three issues that bias or
limit the resulting estimates. They are:
• The sole source curve may reflect management's response to an impending
competition. Therefore, it does not accurately indicate what its behavior would have been
without a competitive threat. For example, management may have elected to charge a
higher price to skim greater profits by exploiting its transient monopoly position, or it may
have set a lower price to deter the creation of a competitor. In the vast majority of
competitive cases with more than two sole source lots, the final sole source point has
been substantially below the learning curve slope. This means that the sole source
baseline for the competitive estimate is often above the last sole source buy, i.e., it is
assumed that the initial competitive buy will be at a higher price than the final sole source
buy. Thus, the baseline model has often provided higher estimates of competitive savings
than logic would support. However, there is no generally acceptable way of statistically
weighting that one particular data point.
• Sole source learning curves based upon price may mask important shifts in cost
and/or profit. For example, extrapolating a learning curve that incorporated significant
profit reductions or increases between the first and second lots implies that profit would
continue to shrink or grow steadily as quantity increased. This is, of course, an
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improbable outcome.
• Learning curves do not treat production rate effects explicitly. Therefore, a
significant rate increase or decrease during competition could cause related price changes
by the initial source to be wrongly attributed to competition.
Alternative Methods
Alternative analytical methods have been employed to correct these problems. But they
have faults of their own, some of which are discussed below.
Sole source learning curves based on cost instead of price seek to avoid problems
caused by significant profit shifts at the beginning of a program. While such curves give a more
accurate picture of initial source behavior regarding cost, they omit consideration of a key factor
related to competition: management decisions about acceptable/achievable profit levels.
Additionally, cost data (exclusive of profit) are often unattainable which, thereby, causes this
methodology to impede interprogram comparisons.
Another alternative methodology constrains the sole source to customary and reasonable
values for learning curve or production rate slopes. This is done to obtain a sole source estimate
devoid of competitive strategies. However, such a wide range of values comprise industry norms
that a "typical value" may be significantly too high or too low for a given case. Thus, prescription
of incorrect values could misstate the magnitude or even the direction of the competitive effect
Several variations of another alternative methodology treat production rate as an
independent variable to eliminate the annual co^t effects of production build-ups or slow-downs.
The idea is that dramatic rate shifts may mask the effects of competition on price. Difficulty in
obtaining accurate data is a fundamental problem with this methodology. Annual procurement
quantities commonly serve as proxies for production rate because they are easier to obtain than
29
data related to annual deliveries. But the two may vary significantly. Furthermore, adept
scheduling has avoided dramatic rate variances implied by large shifts in annual procurement
quantities.
Accurate annual quantity data are necessary but not sufficient to determine rate effects
on cost. Product-oriented plants that produce unique end items (e.g., assembly of Sparrow
missiles) may have different optimal production rates (i.e., Raytheon could be more efficient at a
higher or lower rate than General Dynamics). In other cases, cost effects attributed to rate may
be due to other activities at the plant (e.g., Raytheon 's production cost for Sparrow might increase
or decrease in accordance with production rates for Phoenix, SM-2, Sidewinder, and Maverick).
Thus, effects of production rate on competitive costs may be more apparent than real.
They may even lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. Consider the followinc \ xample where initial
source excess capacity leads to "competitive savings:"
Firm A has special tooling and test equipment sufficient for produc-
ing 1000 units per year. A subsequent program budget reduction
limits it to 600 units per year. Its costs are higher than estimated.
The government establishes Firm B as a second source to produce
up to 60 percent of the new annual quantity (360 units per year).
B submits a lower bid than A for the initial split-buy because its
tooling is appropriate for the new rate (i.e., 360 vs. 1000 units per
year). The government classifies this as another competitive cost
saving.
All of the alternative methodologies introduce problems of their own into the analytical




No methodology has been developed that looks at the causes of competitive behavior and
the effects of competition above the individual program level: specifically, how have firms
managed their mix of programs to achieve optimal returns, and how have broader economic
conditions have affected competitiveness?
Competition has expanded the focus of defense industry management to consider overall
profitability as opposed to the welfare of individual fiefdoms. Now, decision makers for competi-
tive bids more often consider the effect of a program on amortizing fixed overhead and, therefore,
increasing the profitability of programs already in-house. They also weigh technical synergy with
other programs or new business growth targets.
A down side to this greater management perspective is the shifting of costs to "protected
programs." Black programs have grown substantially since the expansion of competition, and
anecdotes about their relatively high overheads abound. Without a systematic analysis of the
effects of competitive programs on a contractor 's total business it is impossible to determine how
the government has fared overall.
Survival is an even more compelling incentive than strategy. Some analysts have
suggested the importance of industry capacity in determining competitiveness. This factor is
evident in shipbuilding where excess industry capacity has combined with competition to generate
dramatic projected savings. Management's choice has been clear: bid at a loss and hope to
recover through subsequent changes or go out of business. And competitive savings are
projected based upon fixed price incentive contracts. These savings may disappear if the
government s ultimate choice is between causing a contractor to file for bankruptcy or terminating
it for default rather than paying a higher price.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
It is important to put objections to the baseline and alternative analytical methodologies
into the proper perspective. Each has its faults. But when used appropriately and their results
are interpreted with restraint, important insights about the "what, how, and why" of competitive
cases follow. Still, single point estimates of added costs or savings attributed to competition
should receive little confidence.
Furthermore, our inability to estimate the economic effects of competition with confidence
implies that models which purport to forecast the economic benefits of competition must address
this fundamental estimation uncertainty. A number of important variables are not captured by the
usual historical data. If these are absent in a predictive model, then they limit its validity.
All the issues raised above notwithstanding, the push toward joint ventured or teamed
development programs leading to production competition has changed the nature of the base'ine
methodology in at least two important respects:
• The "perfect information" gained by involvement in a program from the beginning
should eliminate the occurrence of bids by an "ignorant" second source that typically have
provided "competitive savings."
• When two firms are involved in a development, it is not clear how their learning
curves would compare with a "typical" sole source curve.
Thus, the rules of the game have changed so significantly that even accurate estimates of the
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DUAL SOURCING AS AN ACQUISITION STRATEGY
Karen W. Tyson
Institute for Defense Analyses
This paper is extracted from Karen W. Tyson, et al., Acquiring Major Systems: Cost and Schedule
Trends and Acquisition Initiative Effectiveness, IDA Paper P-2201, March 1989 [20].
1. BACKGROUND
Defense acquisition has a long history of competition. The Armed Services Procurement
Act of 1 947 required that contracts for property or services be formally advertised. OMB Circular
A-109 directs that competition be used throughout a program, particularly during design and
development. Competition at that point has the advantage of allowing the exploration of different
alternatives. Competition often has been used in full-scale development. More recently, however,
the government has emphasized competition in production, the explicit goal being lower prices
and. possibly, better performance.
In the 1 980s, Congress prescribed production competition. In the Defense Appropriations
Act of 1 984, Congress required that any major acquisition program have either a certification that
the system would be procured in insufficient quantities to warrant multiple sourcing or a plan for
the development of two or more sources. The Competition in Contracting Act of 1 984 established
requirements for maximizing competition. Competition was to be the norm; exceptions were to
be justified. CICA required the appointment of competition advocates to review acquisition
strategies. Additional legislation—the Department of Defense Procurement Reform Act and the
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Small Business and Federal Procurement Competition Enhancement Act of 1 984 and the Defense
Procurement Improvement Act of 1 985-also aimed to increase competition in defense contracting.
In addition, the Defense Department has encouraged competition. The Defense
Acquisition Improvement Program (the Carlucci Initiatives), instituted in 1 981 , includes an initiative
to increase competition in the acquisition process. In 1984, the Defense Systems Management
College (DSMC) published a handbook for program managers on enhancing competition [1].
Competition has a number of applications in defense procurement. The types of items
that the government buys can be visualized along a continuum with respect to quantity and
complexity. Small, uncomplicated items that the government buys a lot of over the years are easy
to compete. In many cases, these items are standardized, and it is relatively easy to obtain
multiple sources. At the other end of the continuum, major weapons systems are developed on
a customized basis and produced in relatively small numbers. A company that wants to produce
Sidewinder missiles cannot merely do some quick tooling and start producing them-a detailed
technical data package is needed.
In this paper, dual sourcing in production for major weapon systems and subsystems is
addressed. This type of competition typically requires that the government have a hand in
developing an alternative source, just as it developed the first source. Other methods of
enhancing competition in major weapons systems, including vendor competition, are not
discussed here. After some preliminary points concerning competition and the competitive
environment, empirical results from several analyses are further analyzed and discussed.
2. BENEFITS AND WEAKNESSES
In the short term, the benefits of dual-source competition in major systems might be
expected to include:
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• Lower overall costs
• Increased contractor responsiveness to government needs
• Enhanced system quality and reliability, put in as an attractive feature for
government purchasers. (A number of competition programs, including
Tomahawk and the alternative fighter engine, were motivated more by quality
considerations than by cost.)
Longer-term benefits could include:
• Enhanced industrial base for particular systems
• Increased capital investment by contractors.
In the short term, the weaknesses of competition include additional costs in areas not
found in single-source production: »
• Competition typically requires an up-front investment for tooling, equipment,
qualification, and administration to establish a second source.
• By splitting a buy between two contractors, the government may give up
some economies of scale because the full benefits of le. rning and high-rate
production are not realized. Large buys typically exhibit lower unit costs than small
buys.
• If multiple configurations are required, support costs may increase.
There may be long-term weaknesses of competition with respect to the relationships
between industry and the Department of Defense, but little attention has been paid these issues.
Are the benefr.s of competition a one-time effect, or can they be sustained over time? Production
competition in major systems must be viewed as an investment decision. The potential reduction
in procurement costs must be weighed against additional up-front costs and increased
government administrative costs. This tradeoff is unique for each program.
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The DSMC program managers 'handbook indicates a method for evaluating the impact
of production-level competition on program costs. In evaluating potential or actual cases of
competition, analysts may find these guidelines useful [1, pp. 7-1, 7-2]:
(1
)
Estimate single source recurring production costs by fiscal year in constant dollars
based upon progress curves and expressed as contractor price.
(2) Estimate competitive recurring production costs by fiscal year in constant dollars
based upon progress curves. Reasonable assumptions must be made concerning shift
and rotation and the second source progress curve.
(3) Calculate potential savings by subtracting (2) from (1) by fiscal year.
(4) Calculate net potential savings by subtracting annual incremental government
costs, stated in constant dollars, from (3).
(5) Estimate nonrecurring start-up costs, stated in constant dollars, by fiscal year.
(6) Estimate incremental logistic support costs, stated in constant dollars, by fiscal
year.
(7) Calculate a net present value of competitive versus sole source production costs
by subtracting the discounted costs (5) and (6) from the discounted benefits (3).
(8) Compare discounted, constant, and then-year dollar estimates of single source and
competitive production.
(9) Conduct detailed sensitivity analyses to investigate the effect of changes in key
assumptions on the estimate of savings, and to develop a range of likely estimates.
3. TYPICAL APPLICATION
Competition can be applied in a variety of ways-so many that it is difficult to talk of a
"typical" application. The examples that follow show that variety:
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• In the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) program, the government
required the contractors to fund the costs of technology transfer, but allowed them
to charge back the amount at the rate of 1/1200 of the total cost for each of the
first 1 ,500 missiles (more than they invested). However, the competition provided
the contractors with a powerful incentive not to charge the full amount allowed.
• In the F1 00/1 1 alternative fighter engine program, the government funded
the costs of bringing a partially developed engine to full capability. In the F404
engine competition, the government delivered an engine developed by one
contractor for reverse engineering by another. The government and the second
contractor made some up-front investment.
• In the High-Speed Antiradiation Missile (HARM) program, the government
had a detailed technical data package from the first source, and three potential
competitors invested in developing competing manufacturing methods for the
design. (This program remained sole source.)
• In the Maverick missile program, the competition had a leader and a
follower.
Government funding of the second source is common, as is the use of "educational buys"
or "qualification buys" to get the second source started. Another common factor is the use of
annual competitive bids between contractors. Typically, in major systems, these annual
competitions are not winner-take-all, but the buy is split between the contractors. This practice
can cause the government some problems in fine-luning its approach: the government must give
the winner enough of a "reward" to encourage future low bids, but it must give the loser a large
enough order to keep its production line going. Depending on how its bid is structured, a clever
loser might end up with more profits than a winner.
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4. CASES EXAMINED
To examine the evidence on competition, information was gathered on several programs
from studies on competition by IDA, Rand, and the services (particularly the Navy) [2 through 20].
Among the competitive programs included in the review are the F1 00/1 1 and the F404 alternative
fighter engines and the following missiles: Imaging Infrared (MR) Maverick AGM-65D/F/G,
Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), Sparrow AIM-7F and AIM-7M, HARM, Hellfire,
TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided), Sidewinder AIM-9L and AIM-9M, Phoenix,
basic Stinger, Shillelagh, and Dragon. The analysis of the data gathered is described in the next
section.
5. ANALYSIS
Depending on the appropriateness and availability of data, the following analyses were
conducted:
• Analysis of data on price and quantity, on the number of competitive years,
and on the startup costs of the competition
• Analysis of the costs and benefits of competition
• Analysis of cost and schedule outcomes of 64 major programs, of which
13 are competitive.
The examination of individual cases yielded the following results:
• In the F1 00/1 10 alternative fighter engine competition, the evidence on
savings is confounded by a model change. However, since a model change
(which normally is costly) was achieved without a statistically significant increase
in price, a reasonable interpretation is that competition has had a favorable impact
on unit prices In the F404 engine, savings of $125 million to $300 million were
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found in the analysis.
• In the IIR Maverick program, competition has so far resulted in increased
costs. However, it is possible that the government will achieve savings if it
continues to acquire these missiles through FY 1997 as planned.
• In the Sparrow AIM-7F program, other research (including an independent
evaluation of work by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCA) [2, 6]) found no
evidence of savings. Independent analysis described further in [20] also found no
evidence of savings.
• In the Tomahawk missile program, both the program office and the NCA
show cost savings over sole source.
• In the HARM program, lower prices from the threat of competition resulted
in a decision not to dual source. The incumbent, Texas Instruments, dropped its
price by $209 million for the period FY 1983-85 and by $1.2 billion for the period
FY 1983-89 in order to stay sole source [8].
• In the Hellfire program, there is no evidence of savings from competition.
However, a second source was established at no apparent cost to the government
[19].
In addition to the case studies, several studies of dual-sourced programs were reviewed.
The results of this review are summarized below:
• Berg, et al. [7] found an unclear picture with respect to the Sparrow AIM-7F
competition as to whether there were savings or not. They found no savings in
the Sidewinder AIM-9L competition, but savings of about 11-12 percent were found
in the AIM-9M competition.
• The behavioral aspects of competition-the effects of competition on the
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way contractors do business-are very important. Relatively few sources discuss
these aspects of company strategy. Greer and Liao [17] cite three alternative
strategies a firm may pursue in response to competition. These include:
Constant percentage profit
Penetration pricing-first source sets price low enough to
discourage competition
Skimming price-company sets a high price and lowers it as
necessary to meet competition.
• Greer and Liao use industry capacity utilization as a measure of what
strategy companies are likely to follow. If capacity utilization is high, then firms are
busy and are unlikely to lower prices very far to get work. However, if capacity
utilization is low, firms are willing to be very flexible about price in order to keep
working. More analysis of this type is warranted.
• In 1 987, the NCA examined eight cases of competition for cost savings [2].
They found that five of the eight programs (Sidewinder AIM-9L, armored box
launcher, CG-47 cruiser, LSD-41 landing ship dock, and Mk 1 82-1 chaff cartridge)
had associated net price savings, or at worst, an approximate breakeven. Net
savings estimates ranged from 4 to 24 percent of estimated total sole-source price.
Two programs (Mk 46 Mod 1 and AIM-9M) had a net price loss. AIM-7F had
savings if Lot 3 is the assumed start of competition, but a loss if Lot 5 is the
assumed start.
• Berg, Jondrow, and Pisani [3] used a pooled sample of 18 missile
programs over the period 1970-84. They found that competition had a negative
effect on cost, but it was not generally statistically significant.
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• A study of financial strength as a predictor of pricing strategy (Webb [14])
found that a significant portion of the variance in the price-reduction curve could
be explained by the firm s financial condition measured against industry averages.
While Webb was looking primarily at sole-source programs or at vendors, the
results are interesting to contemplate in the light of competitive strategies. Firms
that are investing most heavily in new plants and equipment are motivated to
adopt market penetration strategies (e.g., work to build market share) to ensure
that their capacity will be used. Firms with poor liquidity will prefer profits in the
near term and may go after small but profitable pieces of the market. For
example, McDonnell Douglas built the Titusville plant exclusively for Tomahawk
missile production, and they have bid aggressively to win ,* lantity. Conversely,




Regression analysis of competitive and non-competitive programs indicated no statistically
significant difference in cost growth between competitive and non-competitive equipment types
[20]. Table 1 shows results from the aggregate analysis. An analysis of averages from the full
sample and from the group of tactical munitions (where virtually all the competition in the group
of programs examined has occurred) is interesting. In the full sample, cost growth under
competition is higher. However, cost growth under competition is lower among the tactical
munitions, where most of the competition has occurred.
In both cases, production quantity growth is much higher in the competitive programs, and
program stretch is much lower. Possible explanations are that stable programs are chosen for
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competition, or that the government keeps competitive programs more stable, given its up-front
investment to dual source.
Table 1 . Comparison of Outcomes for Competitive
and Non-Competitive Programs












(TPCG = Total Program Cost Growth)
PCG 1.78(12)
(PCG = Production Cost Growth)
PQG 1.90(12)
(PQG = Production Quantity Growth)
PSG 2.12(12)
(PSG = Production Schedule Growth)
Stretch 1.65(12)
(Stretch = Total Program Stretchout)
PS 129.0(12)
(PS = Production Schedule)
TS 193.6(12) 167.4(43)
(TS = Total Schedule)
DCG 1.77 1.24(55)
(DCG = Development Cost Growth)
DSG 1.81 1.27(56)
(DSG = Development Schedule Growth)
CS 34.5 32.2 (49)
(CS = Concurrent Schedule)
"Condor (stretch = 56) excluded.
Notes: The competitive tactical munitions programs are TOW, Hellfire, Sparrow AIM-7F and
AIM-7M, Sidewinder AIM-9L and AIM-9M, Maverick AGM-65D, Phoenix AIM-54A and AIM-54C,
Basic Stinger, Shillelagh, and Dragon. The only competitive programs in the database that
were not tactical munitions were the electronic systems SINCGARS (which had only
development information) and the cruise missile Tomahawk. Cost growth figures are dollar-


























7. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The findings of the analyses of competition programs are summarized below:
• In missile programs, cost growth in competitive programs was lower than
in non-competitive programs. While this difference was not statistically significant,
it suggests that competition may be beneficial.
• Findings about competition in the case studies are sensitive to assumptions
about what prices would have been if the program had remained sole source. The
literature on cost savings is contradictory.
• It is easier to find savings in prices than in costs. Several studies
evaluating costs such as engineering hours and manufacturing hours find similar
direct costs in competitive and sole-source programs. Thus, savings from
competition seem to come out of profits, as theory would expect. It makes sense
to look for savings in programs where profits have historically been high.
• Competitive programs tend to buy more quantity than planned over a
longer period of time than planned. This tends to amortize development costs and
second-source startup costs. It may be that the benefits seen from competition
are really benefits of program stability-this is a chicken-egg problem.
• Cross-program effects and industry strategies have been insufficiently
analyzed. Even if the government observes savings from competition, it also
needs to examine whether there are cost increases in sole-source programs
produced in the same plant. Also, in some programs, such as Hellfire, a seesaw
pattern of production was observed, with the companies alternating winning the
major share of the year's production. This might allow the contractors to plan
stable production rates. One-time gains may be possible as competition
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represents a shock to the system-it is unclear that such gains can be sustained
if competition becomes a universal acquisition strategy.
• That cost savings from competition are uncertain should be recognized.
It does not make sense to plan on large, immediate cost savings. Competition
requires some up-front investment, and payback is over a number of years.
• Specific guidelines should be established for competition, similar to those
for multi-year procurement.
• Additional research should be done into the long-term effects of
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RESULTS OF COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENTS
OF NAVY WEAPON SYSTEMS IN THE 1980's
Dr. Brian Flynn*
Dennis Herrin*
Naval Center for Cost Analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Navy and DcQ policy has been to
compete major weapon systems. Cost analyses of competitive procurement at the time of the
Act were often based on different interpretations of Sparrow AIM-7F competition [1] and oi ad
hoc shifts and rotations of the sole-source learning curve. Over the last few years, however, the
Navy has awarded many contracts competitively, usually on a fixed-priced basis, for ships,
missiles, torpedoes, and other weapon systems. Indeed, sole-source procurement of major
weapon systems over the past few years has been the exception rather than the rule.
The Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCA) has gathered data on the results of competitive
procurement of some of these systems for use in performing independent cost estimates and in
analyzing acquisition strategies. While it is impossible to accurately and consistently predict the
behavior of a firm 's unit price under competition, reasonable estimates of overall program savings
or losses based on recent Navy experience nevertheless are possible.
This study presents results of competitive procurement of twelve Navy weapon systems
using price level data. Descriptive statistics are presented showing estimated savings and unit
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price changes under competition. Detailed analyses of each of the twelve cases is found in
NCA's technical report entitled Analysis of Competitive Procurement of Selected Navy Weapon
Systems, Second Edition [2).
It is anticipated that NCA will use this database along with other information to build a
model for estimating the savings from competitive procurement.
2. METHODOLOGY
The savings from competitive procurement were estimated using the formula:
Savings = Projected Sole-Source Costs minus
[ Projected Competitive Costs plus Second-Source Start-Up Costs ],
where each term on the right-hand side is defined as follows:
a. Projected Sole-Source Costs: Sole-source learning curves were estimated at the
price level for eleven of the twelve systems using contract actuals or estimates at
completion. For the MK-48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP) torpedo, a Cost Estimating
Relationship (CER) was used to generate the sole-source curve.
b. Projected Competitive Costs: Learning curves for each company for outyear
awards were usually based on sole-source slopes fitted through that firm s last unit price.
These estimates, then, assume the absence of any further cost savings due to
competition.
c. Second-Source Start-Up Costs: These are costs incurred by the government.
Excluded are any costs that a firm has chosen to absorb to win the competition to
become second-source. These costs include:
1
.
Technology Transfer-Includes contracts to the initial and second sources
for transferring technical knowledge.
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2. Qualification Units-Includes hardware fabrication and testing.
3. Government Support-Includes the cost of field activities and support
contractors to the program office.
4. Special Tooling and Test Equipment-Includes tooling and equipment
unique to the program for which it is procured.
Another measure of the saving from competitive procurement, the percentage savings, is
calculated using the following formula:
Percentage savings = Savings divided by [ Projected Sole Source Cost ] ,
where the savings is calculated on either a recurring or a net basis.
This methodology excludes the following items which are difficult to measure yet
nevertheless are relevant in assessing the overall impact of competition:
a. Added Government Personnel: Additional contracting and program-office
personnel are required to establish a second-source producer. However, less manpower
may be required once competition begins since contracts are usually awarded based
simply on step-ladder quotes rather than on lengthy sole-source negotiations. Hence, the
net effect of this term on competition savings is unclear.
b. Transfer of the Firm s Personnel to Other Projects: A firm may unload engineering
personnel from the program being competed to one that is sole-source, thereby
increasing the cost of the latter and decreasing the true, as opposed to the apparent,
magnitude of savings from competition.
c. Value of Engineering Labor: When a firm cuts engineering labor hours under the
pressure of competitive bidding, the Navy may be losing the services of personnel on the
periphery of the program who were advancing the state of the art in weapon system
technology. This loss represents a cost of competition.
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d. Changes in Hardware Quality: Quality could either improve or diminish under
competition. It might improve as a firm is forced by its opponent to develop new and
better production processes. It might decrease as a firm cuts quality assurance hours.
The cost of quality changes is therefore unclear.
3. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
This section summarizes the results of the analysis of the twelve competitive procurements.
The first section presents estimates of savings or losses, the second briefly explains results of
each acquisition, and the third shows changes in unit price by each firm under competition.
Estimated Savings
Figure 1 shows the estimated percentage return from competition for each system.
Calculations are made from the time second-sourcing began for each system through FY94, with
all values in FY89 constant dollars. Figure 2 shows the estimated return in dollar rather than
percentage terms. Table 1 presents numerical results, while Table 2 presents estimated savings
through only FY89. The following discussion is based on Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1, since
these represent reasonable lifetime projections for the weapon systems under consideration.
It can be seen that estimated net savings are $4.4 billion in FY89$ out of total projected
sole-source costs of $30.9 billion, or 14.2%. Estimated savings on recurring prices are 16.6% of
projected sole-source costs. Estimated second-source start-up costs are 2.4% of projected sole-
source costs.
Of the three programs with the highest percentage net savings, two are ships: CG-47 and
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The two programs with the lowest net savings, Phoenix missiles and F404 engines, started
competition late with few units remaining to be produced. Starting competition late, however,
does not always imply below average savings, as the SM-2 GC&A shows.
In dollar terms, the CG-47 ships program shows the largest net savings by far. It is also
the most expensive program with estimated sole-source costs of almost $10 billion.
Program Differences
This section presents some of the reasons for the variance in savings among the 12
systems.
a. Marginal Savings (less than 5%) : Phoenix missile and F404 engines. Competition
started late in both programs. For Phoenix, more than half of total missile quantity was procured
before the start of head-to-head competition. For F404 engines, competition began in Lot 10.
Further, the Phoenix missile guidance section is highly complex, much more so than the SM-2's;
the number of potential second sources was therefore greatly limited. Similarly, Pratt & Whitney
on the F-404 was the only other firm in the U.S. besides General Electric capable of
manufacturing the engine. The return on competition for these two programs should be
considered a "wash," since estimating error is at least two or three percentage points.
b. Moderate Savings (5 to 1 0%) : TAO-1 87 ships, LCAC s, and VLS canisters. In each
of these acquisitions, either the leader or follower was a vigorous competitor, but never both. On
the TAO program, the second source, Penn Ship, underestimated the cost of the job (Block II)
and performed badly. This limited their effectiveness in subsequent competitions.
On the LCAC program, competition to become second source for these somewhat
unusual craft was limited to two yards. The second source, Avondale Gulfport Marine, has been
moderately effective in competing against Textron Marine Systems.
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On VLS canisters, the second and third sources, FMC and Israel Military Industries,
undercut sole-source prices sharply. But Martin Marietta, the leader, raised their price under
competition.
c. Significant Savings (1 1 to 1 5%) : MK-48 ADCAP, VLS launchers, and SM-2 GC&A.
Both leader and follower bid vigorously in each case. Some of the companies made key strategic
decisions to put themselves in better positions to win contracts. On MK-48 Advanced Capability
torpedo, Hughes changed the location of their fabrication facility from California to Mississippi to
be able to compete with Westinghouse, the follower. On VLS launchers, Martin Marietta dropped
their sole-source price significantly in reaction to FMC's aggressive behavior.
On SM-2 GC&A sets, General Dynamics/Pomona dropped their unit price 35% in the first
year of head-to-head competition, after having been sole-source producer for 20 years.
Raytheon, who fabricates GC&A sets in Tennessee, won the second year with an even lower unit
price.
d. Large Savings (16% and over): Tomahawk missile, CG-47 ships, SM-2 rocket
motor, and LSD-41 ships. Two of the four programs are ships, and shipyards in the U.S. in the
1 980 s bid on a cut-throat basis because of an almost total absence of commercial business. On
CG-47 cruisers, Bath Iron Works badly needed the work as second source because their FFG-7
program was ending. On LSD-41 class ships, hulls 44 to 48 were procured winner-take-all and
yielded higher savings than any other case examined.
On Tomahawk missile, the winner of the majority of the production units has fluctuated
yearly as General Dynamics/Convair and McDonnell Douglas (MDAC) heatedly compete. MDAC
built a missile fabrication facility in Florida to optimize production under second-sourcing.
On SM-2 rocket motor, Morton Thiokol dropped their sole-source price sharply in
response to an extraordinarily low price by the follower, Atlantic Research Corp., on directed-buy
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units.
4. COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR OF FIRST AND SECOND SOURCES
Figure 3 shows the average percent change in combined unit price by both contractors
(the white circles) in each year of competition, relative to the sole-source price. Table 3 provides
individual and aggregate numerical results. Note that only two of the programs analyzed have
had a full five years of competition upon which to base the average. The 32% figure, then, should
not be regarded as representative of programs, in general.
Figure 3 also shows the percent deltas for winning and losing contractors. The winning
firm in any acquisition, of course, may change from year to year. The losing firm in the first four
years of competition receives a price slightly above the sole-source projection. This may be due
to a refusal to play the competition game for low quantities, increased profit, or diseconomies of
scale. The winning firm, on the other hand, is significantly below the sole-source curve.
These results suggest that:
a. Competition intensifies over time as each firm takes the other's measure, and as
each learns that it has to continue to lower its price in order to win the bulk of a production lot.
b. The application of rotations to learning curves may be inappropriate in explaining
the behavior of prices under competition. Of crucial concern to a firm is its expectation of what
the other firm will bid.
Figures 4 and 5 further analyse the data shown in Table 3. Figure 4 graphs the percent
change in unit price in the first year of competition for each of the twelve systems. Since these
figures are in percentage terms, the combined delta for some programs is only slightly positive
while net dollar savings to the Navy turn out to be large.


































































Percent Delta in Recurring Unit Price
By Year of Competition
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
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the guidance section of the missile which represents about 20 to 25% of total cost. As
competition commenced they built a new fabrication facility in Florida to take advantage of lower
labor rates and to optimize plant size for expected competitive quantities. Their prices were high
in FY85 and FY86, the first two years of competition. Then they sharply lowered price in FY87.
General Dynamics responded in kind in FY88. Then MDAC in FY89 dropped their price to over
40% below the sole-source projection, as shown in Figure 5.
Comparing the behavior of initial and second sources in the first year of competition to
the last year of competition reveals that:
a. The average delta in recurring unit price for the first source does not change much.
It is 12% below sole source the first year and 13% below the last year.
b. However, the average delta for the second-source changes drastically, from 2.6%
above sole-source the first year to 16.8% below sole-source the last year. Moreover, in many
cases (e.g., Tomahawk), the second-source has become the winner, receiving 70% of the annual
buy.
c. The behavior of the second-source determines the magnitude of the savings from
competition. When the second-source fails to beat the first-source, savings tend to be small
(F404, TAO-1 87, and LCAC). When the second-source beats the first-source, savings are much
larger (SM-2 GC&A, Tomahawk, and LSD-41).
5. CONCLUSIONS
Major conclusions of this study are that:
a. The Navy's program of competitive procurement during the 1980s has reduced
unit prices of weapon systems and yielded a positive return on investment. Two of the programs
analyzed show essentially zero savings to date while all the others show moderate to large
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savings.
b. Under competitive procurement, firms manage to reduce unit prices of weapon
systems in ways that the government can not predict. Included are major strategic decisions to
relocate fabrication facilities and to build new plants of optimum size for second sourcing.
c. Learning curves are insufficient in explaining changes in unit prices under
competition. The pricing strategy of a firm seems much more important, that is, deciding what
unit price is needed to beat the opposition.
In summary, while competition worked well in reducing prices and saving money in the
1980s, it is unclear if this will continue in the 1990's. The former procurements occurred during
the defense build-up. The latter will occur in a much different environment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Background
Competitive procurement of defense goods and services long has been a stated objective
of the Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD). Benefits that have been attributed to
competition include reduced and controlled costs, improved performance, enhanced industrial
base, reduced risk, and improved quality. The potential benefits of competition have led to
increased interest in the use of competition to reduce and control weapon system costs. For
example, the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 mandated the use of effective
competition throughout the weapon system acquisition cycle, except in extremely limited
circumstances. The use of effective competition in this context encompasses both sealed bids
and competitively negotiated procurements.
Much of the recent emphasis on increased competition has concentrated on the use of
competition during production to reduce weapon system costs. Increasingly, the other
hypothesized benefits of competition, improved quality and reliability, enhanced delivery, reduced
risk, improved performance and controlled cost, have become objectives of weapon system
competition. Attainment of these objectives may require that competition begin prior to the
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production phase. This paper concentrates on the use of competition during development to
attain key program goals.
Competition during development may involve competitive system validation or competitive
Full Scale Development (FSD). Competition during system validation, or competitive prototyping,
is a strategy in which two or more competing designs of a future weapon system are funded
through a prototype stage. Source selection then is based upon the demonstrated performance
of the competing prototypes with regard to technical achievements, cost, producibility, and logistic
support.
Competing firms also may be maintained through FSD; however, few programs have
undertaken this approach due to the high initial investment associated with funding two firms in
FSD. Recent programs which involved competitive FSD include the Air Launched Cruise Missile,
the Division Air Defense Gun, and the UH-60A Helicopter. Under both competitive strategies, the
actual performance of the systems is a major factor in the decision of which contractor will
continue with subsequent phases of the acquisition. An overview of competitive development is
provided in Figure 1.
This paper discusses the use of competition during the development of a weapon system
program. The results of recent programs are summarized as well as several key factors
associated with successfully implementing development competition. Specifically, this paper
presents a theoretical discussion of the benefits of competition during development, a summary
of previous studies on this subject, the results of our recent analysis, and our thoughts on the
future.
Previous Research on Production Competition
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used as a baseline. Relaxing this assumption results in altering the shift and rotation. Extensive
sensitivity analysis is conducted based on relaxed assumptions reflecting imperfect knowledge
on the part of the system developer.
2. THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT COMPETITION
The hypothetical costs and benefits attributed to the use of competition during
development include both price and non-price considerations and differ between development
and production.
Benefits During The Development Phase
Some recurring concerns in weapon system development are the continuing escalation
of program costs over original estimates, lengthened schedules, and greater technical risk due
to changing specifications. One of the often hypothesized benefits of development competition
during the development phase is enhanced cost control or cost growth avoidance. The
competitive nature during the development effort is expected to incentivize contractors to control
cost through reduction of technical risk and maintenance of schedule requirements. It is also
hypothesized that the overall technical design will meet or exceed original specifications given the
competition between designs for FSD.
Benefits In Production And Beyond
The major problems found in the wee pon system production z nd operation phases are
increasing costs, poor manufacturing designs, and unacceptable field performance weapon
system reliability due to an inadequate technical design. It is hypothesized that because
competition during development can result in the selection of a single design for production,
69
developers are incentivized to provide a design suited to production with increased field
performance and reliability. It has also been hypothesized that development competition reduces
production costs through a reduced first unit cost (T1) going into first lot production as depicted
in Figure 2.
The Costs Of Competitive Development
Development competition can affect system acquisition costs from the demonstration and
validation phase through the production and the operation and support phases. Initially, costs
may be higher than in a comparable single-source program, since it is necessary to fund two or
more competitors' development efforts until their systems have been evaluated and a down
selection point has t een reached. Historically, the cost of the prototyping o.hase has varied from
7 to 20 percent of total acquisition costs.
The costs of competitive development often have been mistakenly assumed to be twice
the cost of a comparable single source effort. This assumption is predicated on the duplication
of the entire develoi i^ent effort; however, it ignores the logical program res'-ucturing that would
occur to incorporate multiple contractors. For example, a single source development effort may
involve the fabrication and test of ten development units. In a competitive development, the test
program may require an additional five test articles for a total of 15 rather than 20. Similarly,
additional government management personnel may be required to direct two development
contractors; however, these personnel will not represent a duplication of the entire program office.
The most obvious costs associated with competitive development include the following:
• Redundant engineering and design efforts
• Additional test articles and test support
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• Redundant contractor management
• Additional program office management.
The extent to which these costs outweigh the benefits of development competition is often
cited with little supporting documentation. Quantifying these costs is necessary in order to
compare the benefits of development competition to its costs.
3. PRIOR DEVELOPMENT COMPETITION STUDIES
Few research efforts have assessed the programmatic impact of competitive development.
Empirical research conducted by Rand has indicated that competitive prototype programs have
experienced generally lower total program cost growth than single source programs [1 ]. Figure
3 presents the annual cost growth trends for SAR-level programs that involved competitive
prototyping and single source development programs. The average annual growth for single
source programs is 5.6 percent, while the average annual growth for the competitive prototype
programs is 2.4 percent.
Cost growth for competitive development has been less in both FSD and procurement.
A recent review of total program cost growth during FSD has indicated that programs with
competitive FSD phases have incurred an average cost growth of two percent while comparable
single source efforts have incurred cost growth of over 40 percent [2]. The percentage cost
growths exclude inflation and the effects of quantity changes. The small sample size of three
competitive FSD programs does not allow statistical analyses. The results do suggest that
competitive FSD results in enhanced cost control.
The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) compiled a data set of 14 competitive
(development/design) and 27 noncompetitive programs using 1982 SAR data [3]. The average
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programs and 5.8 percent for the noncompetitive sample. The IDA paper experiments with
adjustments to the data set in order to circumvent extreme sample values, as well as other
problems which emerge from any data analysis. Jhe largest problem which emerges from the
analysis is the low confidence levels of the estimates arising from relatively low sample sizes and
wide variability in the data. Table I summarizes the IDA report.
































































































'Average annual percentage change in constant-dollar unit procurement cost (UPC) from time of development esti-
mate (DE) until December 1982 Based on information in Selected Acquisition Report (U), December 1982. SECRET
Information derived for this report is unclassified.
Several hazards exist in aggregate data analysis of this type. Problems include:
• Design changes
• Quantity requirement changes
74
• Small sample sizes (especially for competitive programs)
• Wide variability in cost data
• Inconsistent use of design to cost (DTC) goals.
Comparison of production cost growth rates suggest that development competition may
help control production cost growth. Small sample sizes, wide variability of the data, and
program specific characteristics prevent a more accurate measure using this type of analysis.
The Analytic Sciences Corporation (TASC) has recently examined several aspects of some
recent competitive development efforts. Building upon the previous research efforts, the TASC
effort has detailed both the aggregate and programmatic impacts of competitive development.
The results are discussed in the following section.
4. RECENT PROGRAMS
As use of development competition increases over time, useful insights and lessons
learned should add to the knowledge base for this type of competition. Already with limited
applications of development competition, significant lessons learned have accumulated. Case
histories which presently yield some significant insights include SINCGARS-V, MLRS, AH-64, and
ALCM.
SINCGARS
The Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS-V) is the VHF-FM
radio communications system providing the primary means of command and control for infantry,
artillery, and armor units. The SINCGARS program is summarized in Figure 4.
The SINCGARS validation efforts began in April 1978, with three firms under contract to










































































































































































































were contracted to develop the slow frequency hopping (SFH) concept, while Rockwell Collins
was to develop the fast frequency hopping (FFH) technique. Rockwell was dropped in January
1982 because their design offered a much higher technological risk than the other two efforts.
The two remaining contractors, ITT and Cincinnati Electronics, received engineering development
contracts, in parallel, with the advanced development efforts already underway. A production
contract award was planned for Fiscal Year 1983.
During December 1983, ITT was awarded a single year production contract with four
option years. The contract was of the firm fixed price type with economic price adjustment
(FFP/A). Although both contractors had technologically acceptable designs, ITT's design was
further along and presented less risk for production. Production costs were the deciding factor.
Before the third option was awarded, reliability problems arose during first article testing. The
awarding of the final two options was suspended while ITT solved the problems. After ITT had
spent considerable internal funds improving reliability, the production contract was re-baselined
for award of the final two option years during Fiscal Year 1988.
During validation, when the Army was primarily concerned with technological factors, the
projected unit production costs grew. The initial design to unit procurement cost (DTUPC) goals
were abandoned. The configuration was upgraded and system capabilities were expanded.
Once the two remaining producers proceeded into advanced development, cost became the
overriding factor and projected production costs have remained under control. Also, with the
presence of another contractor during advanced development, the winning firm was willing to
accept a cost ceiling which, c,iven the eventual reliability problems, resulted in substantial savings
to the Army. Table II illustrates the changes in SINCGARS unit production cost.
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Table II SINCGARS-V Production Cost (FY84$)
Calendar Year Unit Cost
1978 $ 3,702 (Goal)
1982 $12,768 (Goal)
1984 $ 8,751 (Actual)
Multiple Launch Rocket System
The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) was designed to supplement cannon
weapons by delivering a large volume of firepower in a short time. The MLRS, with a
dual-purpose improved conventional submunition warhead, will provide an all-weather, indirect
fire capability to attack the enemy 's indirect fire weapons, air defense systems, and light material
and personnel targets, especially during surge conditions.
The technology for the system was well established prior to program validation. Significant
protions of the technology were previously applied. New development areas were kept simple.
The MLRS program is summarized in Figure 5.
The acquisition strategy involved two contractors, Boeing Aerospace Co. and Vought
Corporation, in a competitive validation. The winner of the competition could receive single
source contracts for the $3.5 billion planned production program. The winner would proceed into
a qualification phase, during which a multiyear bid for production would be submitted. If the
multiyear bid held close to the projected prices which were proposeo during the competitive
validation, then the government planned to award the multiyear contract. If the government felt
the production bid was high, then they planned to establish a second production source.




selection criteria were cost and performance. Both contractors reduced projected production
costs by approximately 25 percent during the competition. Vought Corporation won the
competition and proceeded into the qualification phase. Vought eventually was awarded a
multiyear production contract as they reduced their planned production costs an additional two
percent during the multiyear bid. The program office noted that both contractors were highly
motivated by the large production program. Beneficial actions cited by the program office
included:
• Creation of separate divisions to offload high corporate overhead
• Location of plants in low-cost labor areas
• Colocate of plants with subcontractors to reduce transportation costs
• Automation of production systems
• Agreement to substantial corporate investment
• Use of deferred methods of amortizing investments
• Negotiation of fixed price contracts with subcontractors
• Agreement to low profit percentage and FPI contracts with low price ceilings
• Acceptance of ceilings on development contracts.
Although the MLRS represents a relatively simple development effort, the acquisition
program includes key features which emerge as important to a successful implementation of
development competition. These features include:
«> Emphasis on producibility
• Substantial reward for winning
• Cost effectiveness is primary selection criterion.
AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopter
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The AH-64 carries the laser-guided Hellfire antitank missile as well as a 30mm chain gun
and 2.75 inch rockets for suppressive fire. The AH-64 features a sophisticated target
acquisition/designatoin sight (TADS) including a laser range finder as well as a television camera
and a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system for night vision. A pilot night vision sensor (PNVS)
also is included for accomplishing several maneuvers.
Phase One was an engineering development of the air vehicle but it did not include
integration of the mission subsystem. Hughes and Bell competed in this 36-month engineering
development phase one effort; the winner of the competitive phase (which included a fly-off) was
to proceed into a single-source FSD effort. The Apache program is summarized in Figure 6.
Cost and performance received equal weight as selection criteria. A ceiling of $1 .6 million
(FY72 dollars) for unit production was enforced by the program office. Proposals with unit costs
exceeding the $1 .6 million figure were considered nonresponsive. Unit production cost goals for
the program and the contractors ranged from $1.1 to $1.4 million dollars. Hughes won the
competition. Since both firms went to ceiling on costs, the selection was made on the basis of
performance and producibility considerations.
During the single source (phase two) effort, several problems arose. A change in
requirements led to significant integration problems. Also, with contracting now on a single
source basis, most competitive pressure on costs had been removed (subsystem competitive
development effort for a new TADS/PMS system was enacted, but produced questionable cost
savings). After the single source Phase Two effort, unit production cost had grown to almost $4
million.
Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)
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Cruise Missiles Project Office. The competition matched the Boeing ALCM versus the General
Dynamics Ship Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM), with Boeing eventually winning the production
award. The objectives of the competition included cost and schedule control. The competition
featured a pilot production and fully integrated launch from the B-52.
A major objective of the ALCM competition was to control unit production costs. Firm bids
on pre-priced production lots were required. Several cost reducing design changes resulted from
the competition. The competition was introduced after the two competing designs were relatively
firm, allowing the competitors to concentrate on reducing unit production costs.
When the ALCM went into production, Boeing attained the first unit goal of 5669 labor
hours. The program office projected a labor hour cost improvement rate of 0.85; however,
Boeing realized a 0.65 cost improvement rate for the initial production lots, as depicted in Figure
7. This significant reduction was attributed to Boeing's "Curvebuster Program" in which
cost-reducing measures were implemented throughout the facility to enhance Boeing s ability to
attain their competitive production bid. As a result, the average unit cost of the initial lots was 20
to 30 percent less than originally estimated.
Summary
Examination of the case studies revealed specific examples of procurement cost savings
attributable to development competition. These examples include:
• Major design innovations reduced cost and improved performance
• Costly design features were avoided without degrading system capabilities
• Cost/performance tradeoffs eliminated certain capabilities that the contractors
found (with government encouragement) to be too costly in light of service
priorities and design-to-cost (DTC) goals
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• Producibility changes to designs and production methods had important
cost-reducing impacts.
5. CONCLUSIONS
With the defense environment entering a period of budget austerity, policymakers must
focus on the benefits of dual-source competitive development efforts. Evidence indicates that the
initial costs and risks of a dual source development effort are often rewarded by a successful
long-term program. If the program manager's objectives (e.g., production cost ceilings,
performance requirements, life-cycle cost goals, schedule constraints) are achieved, then the initial
risk of a competitive development was worth the upfront investment.
A comprehensive cost-benefit approach is clearly required. The initial costs, risks, and
administrative requirements of conducting a dual source development must be evaluated against
the future rewards of a successful competitive effort. These future rewards are not only defined
on a programmatic basis, but are determined by program management when the competition is




Performance and quality improvements
Industrial base considerations.
Research at TASC has concentrated on building an effective cost-benefit methodology.
The initial effort consisted of both a compilation and an examination of a comprehensive data
base. The collection of data is ongoing. Currently, relationships are being identified, quantified,
and coded into a cost-benefit model. This effort will ultimately provide program managers with
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a methodology that will help determine the likelihood of success for alternative development
competition strategies.
Difficult and challenging decisions lie ahead if the services are to increase the use of
development competition. Policymakers must recognize the significant future rewards in order
to allow the necessary upfront funding. The services must accurately define long-term objectives
when deciding on whether to use development competition. Program management must
structure the competition in a manner that drives the contractors to the desired goals. As the
frequency and use of development competition increases, important lessons learned must help
provide a path for future programs in this area.
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COMPETITION IN WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION:
A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION
Discussants
RADM William C. Carlson, USN
Assistant Deputy Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command
Dr. John J. Hamre
Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee
Dr. David L. McNicol
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Moderator
Dr. Daniel A. Nussbaum
Naval Center for Cost Analysis
A roundtable discussion was held on 8 September 1989 on the final morning of the
Symposium. The Symposium was very fortunate to have these three distinguished panel
members available to discuss various aspects of competition in weapon systems acquisition.
Their vitas follow the transcript.
Questions for the discussion were proposed by the moderator and were modified with
feedback from the discussants into final form prior to the discussion. The following is a transcript
of the entire 75 minute discussion, although redundant portions have been edited.
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NUSSBAUM: Do you think that most people 's opinions about competition are grounded in data
and analysis, or are they opinions and prejudices, and 111 ask Adm. Carlson to
address that question:
CARLSON: Well, I think the way the question is phrased tells pretty much what the answer
really is. It says, "Are most people's opinions about competition, etc." What we
have are opinions, because very seldomly do we procure any given device both
ways. If you really wanted to know the ideal answer, you would have to procure
it both ways. This would give us a control, and then we would compare the
control group against the competitive procurement. We cannot do that, not in this
business. Therefore, we are reduced to the fact that we have to perform predictive
analysis in order to make the decision. Then we go back afterward and either
claim victory or have to acknowledge defeat. I think that is where you as cost
analysts come in, because you will be the personnel that have to change the fear
and superstition that is the current basis for our decision on competiiion and put
the decision on a firm analytical basis. Claims of 25% savings due to competition
by comparing the contract price to the budget are of somewhat questionable
validity. As we gather additional data, you cost analysts will be very deeply
involved in going over the data, validating the assumptions that were made initially,
and providing a predictive tool which can be more effective. We hope that
competition will bring fairer prices and be effective in defense acquisition.
HAMRE: I have to start with an announcement which is. I'm allowed only to put at risk my
own career, so therefore my comments are mine alone and donl reflect Senator
Nunn, for whom I work, or the committee. Please honor my request that these
comments are strictly my views. First, on a broader and more philosophic starting
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point, I'd like to echo some of what RADM Carlson said. Competition is one of
those icons in American politics, like the flag, the pledge of allegiance, and free
enterprise. Everybody loves these things, and they are cited in everybody's
speeches. However, I spend much of my time fighting people who are trying to
limit competition. You know, business really doesnt like to compete. They love
monopoly. So we tend to have a dichotomy in our society between public rhetoric
about competition and the reality. And, of course, that comes to a focus in an
organization like the Congress which is inherently a political organization, and I
dont mean partisan when I say political and I dont mean politics. What I mean
is that Congress is an institution which must resolve questions that cant be
resolved anyplace else. These issues cant be resolved in a court of law; they
cant be resolved in the marketplace; they cant be resolved administratively. You
have to solve them politically and come up with a compromise where you reconcile
competing goals against a finite amount of resources. Those are inherently
political decisions, and that's not a bad thing. You have to have a mechanism in
our society to do that. So you find this tension between the rhetoric about
competition and the reality which comes to a very crisp focus in Congress all the
time. Now to the precise wording of your question on the perception of
competition: is it based on facts or is it based on prejudice? RADM Carlson said
that so much of the whole business with competition, especially the claims of
savings, is determined before the facts are in. That is a problem that we live with
in Congress all the time. Everything is inherently prospective. When we decide
whether or not to authorize and appropriate funds for M1 tanks in fiscal year 1 990,
we're making that decision in fiscal year 1989, we wont start building them until
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1992, and you wont see the final cost accounting until 1994. So everything is
inherently prospective and by definition that also means it is inherently political.
That means, of course, you can t document anything that hasn t occurred, and so
competition tends to enter into Congressional debate as part of the currency of the
debate. Now, that's not atypical of debate on the Hill. There is no set of data
upon which people are acting, save for what you cost analysts produce. So I
would echo very much what RADM Carlson said, that the starting point of rational
choice, when it comes to the issue of competition, has to be with the best analysis
that we can bring to bear in advance. It will help. It wont necessarily make the
outcome the best outcome, but it will help to avoid the worst outcome.
MCNICOL: I get my licks in on this issue very frequently, so I will be brief, but not silent. I
agree with the thrust of RADM Carlson 's comments that, while the positions taken
on dual sourcing are based on data and analysis, the data and analysis that we
have available are really inadequate. Let me offer two little pieces of evidence in
favor of that. First, I have never heard anyone, in the context of the CAIG or
anywhere else, offer an argument demonstrating that dual sourcing will, in fact,
produce price competition. It is always simply assumed that dual sourcing will
produce price competition. That cannot simply be assumed, because it is
perfectly possible to structure an acquisition strategy so that you have, in effect,
two single sources. Moreover, those two firms may bid price up rather than bid
price down to cost. Second, I think there's a logical problem that we often shy
away from when using historical data. You can imagine using an average to
predict the next element of the sequence 3, 6, and 9. The average is 6, which
involves 50% error if the next element is 1 2. Even in the world of cost analysis for
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budgeting that's a big error. But, without any apology, we often take a sample of
systems that were dual sourced, then we average the data and say that the result
will be characteristic of the system in question. I think we would do better to
consider the issue of what are the similarities and what are the differences between
the system wete talking about and those in the database. As we go on in the
conversation this morning, I will suggest that such a look will point to many
relevant differences, and to say that a particular system is dual sourced instead of
sole sourced does not say very much.
HAMRE: Well, I 'd like to say more concerning this issue of facts versus perception. There
is an alarming quality where facts are made adjustable when the political
requirements demand that we support one course or another. Let me use as an
example the Phoenix Missile. I remember when a senior member of the Defense
Secretariat came over to talk to me about the analysis which showed that it was
cost effective to qualify a second producer for the Phoenix. A second source was
cost-effective only with inflated inventory goals. The inventory objective was jacked
up to 7,000 missiles, when only 4,500 were required. Then we spent $95 million
to qualify a second source producer, and now we are having the first year of
competition. Yet the pending budget proposes to terminate the Phoenix dual
sourcing program, and the inventory objective has dropped back to 4,500. The
best analysis that any of you folks could bring to bear wouldnt make a whit of
difference in that kind of an outcome. That was politics. And in the same way, we
have this situation for almost every missile program this year. WeVe got
competition on the Standard missile, on HARM, on HELLFIRE, starting on Stinger,
and on TOW. On every one of these programs, right now, we are procuring these
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missiles below the minimum efficient rate for one producer. And yet we spend all
this money qualifying a second source producer. So if we're going to have
competition, and I think that missiles are among the most productive areas to have
competition because the units to be procured are large enough and efficiencies
are great enough to justify competition, you have to buy what you say you're
going to buy. And we're not doing that. So, in recent years all the benefits of
competition that we sought in missiles are like purchasing a bond and deciding
to throw away the coupon. If we Ye really going to make a decision and embrace
competition as acquisition strategy, we Ve got to carry through. If we don t carry
through, weVe wasted the taxpayer's money.
CARLSON: I think that's one of the very fundamental things that I would like to emphasize.
I agree with Dr. Hamre but only partially. Because of the emphasis weVe had on
second sourcing over the last few years, we have lured companies into making
significant investments on the promise of a chance to recoup that investment and
make a profit in the future. That has given our acquisition plans and strategies a
great deal of inertia. How many times will General Electric or Westinghouse make
a $100 million investment on the promise of some business in the future. Once,
perhaps. But trick me twice, shame on me. I recall a conversation that I had with
Norm Augustine on this very issue when we kept getting into more and more
competition. He made the comment that it was becoming impossible to make a
buck, and he was thinking of getting out of the defense business. I said, "What
are you guys doing? Why doesn \ industry just say no? That's enough. We're
not going to make any investments." He has a way with words, as you know. He
looked at me, and he said, "Bill, when someone comes at you with a gun in his
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hand and asks for money, your first inclination isnt that he's trying to sell you the
gun." And to a large extent that's the way industry approached this issue. We
forced them. We have an interesting economic situation. We have a relatively
large number of suppliers and only one customer. We have established the
conditions of the defense business. And now we have said that these conditions
are no longer favorable, and we're going to change them. It was not very long
ago that General Electric was suspended because they refused to give their
proprietary data on jet engines to Pratt and Whitney so that Pratt and Whitney
could compete. And I 'm sure you noticed that approximately two weeks ago an
announcement was made that the contract for the jet engines was let on a winner-
take-all basis. General Electric won a contract year and, I believe, four option
yearc. If you are a Pratt and Whitney type individual you might view this slightly
askance, in that, if you didnt have a contractual arrangement, you certainly had
an implied promise that we would maintain our previous conditions. Unfortunately,
we ir the Department of Defense are in no position to ever make this type of
guarantee to any company, or even to imply such a guarantee, because our
masters in Congress are the ones who decide what we can and cannot do. It's
a quandary.
MCNICOL: Let me pick up on an aspect of this; one of PA&E's perennial arguments is that
if a system is dual sourced, the planned annual buy must be large enough to
(•justify dual sourcing, and the buy must be executed approximately as planned.
Departures from that ideal cannot be put entirely on the Defense Department's
back, I should note. I would also like to comment on the question of investment
by individual producers. They certainly don t like the idea of making an investment
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which is not recouped and which, in fact, is not guaranteed. As I understand it,
that is no longer really a prospect, due to legislation now on the books that, in
effect, guarantees that firms which do make a capital investment under dual source
circumstances will get it back. It's not at all clear to me that this is a wise course.
If you're talking about competition-in the sense that competition is used in the
private market-it means that you have your company s money on the line and you
will not necessarily get it back. In fact, the goad of not necessarily getting your
company's money back is a large part of competition, and one of the real
enforcement mechanisms in competition is the failure of firms which results when
they do not make the correct economic choices. It is not at all clear to me that the
folks who have favored competition have really understood what it is that they're
favoring. But if what we really want is competition, we must be prepared to do
things like see companies losing money on defense contracts.
NUSSBAUM: Is there some prospective way to tell what systems are particularly attractive or
particularly unattractive for dual sourcing and competition? Or is it all a dice
throw?
CARLSON: Id be happy to take that because I'm one of the guys who has to make those
types of decisions and start the programs off. There are certainly a large number
of people interested in my decision as I go through the large number of decision-
makers and ankle-biters that influence my position. The ankle-biters are always
interesting because they are in a position to say no or to torque your program, but
they don t accept any responsibility for the success or failure of your program. It s
just that they have a special interest that allows them to torque it.
HAMRE: Please let me offer a general comment, and please interrupt me when you desire.
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This is a philosophical perspective on competition. Competition is probably the
right way to proceed when the budget is expanding. It's probably the wrong way
to go when the budget is contracting. It's my personal view that there has been
a competition between two strategies-dual sourcing and multiyear procurement-
with the Navy being the primary advocate of dual sourcing and with the Army
being the primary advocate of multiyear contracts. I think that the overall
environment suggests that you're probably going to do better when the budget
is expanding by competing systems, as a general philosophy. But when the
budget tightens up, you're probably going to do better, in price and quality, by
pursuing a multi-year strategy. I think that's a general perception on the Hill.
CARLSON: I think that 's absolutely true. I think also, though, you have to look at what you 're
talking about in the way of equipment. Dr. Hamre previously used the example of
missiles. You have to procure a large quantity of any system in order to make it
economically realistic for more than one manufacturer to operate a continuous
production line. Obviously there must be economies associated with that. As was
mentioned earlier in the discussion, if you're procuring less than an economic
order quantity in the first place, it is difficult to divide production into two pieces
and have either of those be of economic order quantity. That's pretty basic. So
you have to have something that you will procure in quantity. I would also prefer,
when we start talking about dual-sourcing, to have something that has multiplicious
application. For example, transistors, IC's, basic components, or standard
electronic modules can be used in many things. Why do I say that? Because you
must assure a manufacturer, who is going to make an investment, that there is at
least a reasonable market in the future. If you 're dual sourcing one program with
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only one application, because of the way that our system works in annual
budgeting, there is inherent risk. So I would think that the most attractive items
would be multiplicious in application. When you get to very large items, I think it's
a big mistake to ask for a second source in something that requires a phenomenal
investment on the part of the company. I m talking in terms of hundreds of millions
of dollars. Take, for example, the SQQ-89 that some of you are familiar with. If,
in fact, you 're buying perhaps only thirteen combat systems a year and you divide
that between two groups, it's hard to see how a producer is ever going to recoup
his investment. We said, "You fund your own start-up costs, you get qualified, you
get started, and then we will give you a chance to compete." Even on the
government side, there are serious ramifications to this approach. Take, for
example, special test equipment. By law we will pay the contractor for his
investments on a five year amortized basis for any special test equipment. Well
that's really great, but if I change contractors six years from now that means that
I get to buy the equipment again even though I already paid for it once. I not only
paid for the equipment, I paid for the cost of money associated with it, but now I
still dont own it. So now I have to buy it again if I'm going to change
manufacturers. Well, this puts me in a position that I dont want to be in. The
whole reason we wanted to use competition in the first place was that we didnt
want to be over a barrel, with the contractor's hand in our pocket, when he is the
sole source and I cant get anybody else to prodi ce the system. We should
qualify a second source for a whole host of benefits: competition, broadening of
the industrial base, mobilization enhancement, etc. But the system should be
something that we buy in large quantities, it should have multiplicious application,
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and we should be able to anticipate that it's going to be required for a long period
of time. You know, buggy whips are not in great demand today. You don t want
something that's going to be eclipsed by technology very quickly.
MCNICOL: Let me generalize the points you made concerning the sorts of systems that will
be prime candidates for dual sourcing. It seems to me that there are three criteria
that you might look to fairly specifically. One is low facilitization costs; second is
not much change in unit cost with quantity; and third is not much loss of learning
with changes in quantity. Those three conditions are satisfied, as you say, by the
systems that DoD buys in very large quantities; missiles, for example. Interestingly
enough, they can also be satisfied by some systems DoD buys in very small
quantities-ships. A very interesting question it seems to me that hasn t gotten the
kind of analysis that it deserves is, "Just how is it that those two cases are similar
and different?" What kind of case can we really make a priori for dual-sourcing
ships? The problem there, as you're well aware, RADM Carlson, is that you have
to start, at some point, thinking about the complexity of the systems you buy and
whether that complexity in and of itself is going to defeat dual-sourcing. There's
another broader point that Dr. Hamre brought up, on which I can offer some
further comment. Viewing this deliberately as something of a technician, it's not
obvious to me why dual-sourcing would be more or less attractive depending
upon the direction the budget's going. My assumption is that Dr. Hamre is
speaking not so much to stable economic facts, but to what is likely to happen to
the programs as they go through the budget mill in the Department and then in
the Congress.




value from one technique or the other, but those past several years of unusual
growth in the defense budget has dramatically overinflated our expectations, and
a lot of people embedded the assumptions of continued budget growth in their
planning and pricing. And the government, frankly, justified a lot of those
competitions based on the assumption of unrealistic budget growth. I think we Ye
going to be startled by how very little we got out of dual-sourcing.
Were you referring specifically to dual-sourcing or that we mispriced those early
systems?
When someone tells you, "I dont care what you think the requirement is, the
quantity is now 7,000; now do the numbers." It's that sort of thing that I m talking
about. The problem that we had during the mid-80 s, and this is not a partisan
comment because curiously we had the reverse problem during the Carter
Administration, where we dramatically overstated the amount of money in real
terms that was going to be available in the out years of the FYDP. So it was
possible to shove so much more program into a five year plan than we could ever
realize. When we actually got to that out year, it could be accomodated only by
introducing inefficiencies in the way we bought everything. We had exactly the
same problems in the Carter years by underestimating inflation. So when we
actually got to the out years, there was dramatically less real growth than was
anticipated. I dont know that there is, from a technical standpoint, any way that
you can solve these kinds of macro problems that are cultural in nature which are
embedded in a political process. Im not suggesting that such a broad strategy
be uniformly applied; everything has to be done on a case-by-case basis. I think
philosophically from our perception, given this trend that we're entering a period
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of substantial uncertainty, i.e., static and declining budgets, it probably isnt the
best time to bet on savings from competition. It's probably best to preserve the
savings you can and maximize quality within multi-year contracts, as a general
proposition.
NUSSBAUM: Perhaps we can switch to an acquisition question. Right now we have many
contractors that are teaming during the R&D phase, and later they will be split
apart during the production phase. Is this, in your opinion, a reasonable
acquisition strategy or are there better strategies?
CARLSON: Let me take that, because I do have an opinion. I have opinions on most of these
issues. IVe been in acquisition management since 1982, and for a sailor that's a
long-time in scenic Washington. But on this dual-sourcing bpue, we have created
some very strange bedfellows. Under the aegis of competition, we've taken
people that have traditionally been competitors and we have put them together.
We have taken people that used to be together and we Ve rent them asunder. Let
me g !ye you an encapsulated view of something that has happened. I have
become more involved with industrial associations and nonprofit organizations-
American Defense Preparedness Association, National Industrial Security
Association, and groups of this type. If you go back before we had competition,
we had what I call the baronies in production of Navy systems. That was a time
when, if you were talking about surface ship ASW, you were talking about General
Electric in Syracuse, New York. If you were talking about combat systems in
submarines, you were talking about IBM, Manassas. If you were talking about
torpedo producers, you were talking about Clevite in Cleveland and Honeywell in
Minneapolis, in heavyweight and lightweight, respectively. These were baronies.
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As a result, a very interesting thing happened. Because of the clearly established
supremacy of one firm in an area, we were able to maintain top-notch quality
groups of engineers over long periods of time at a given location. Let's use
General Electric at Syracuse as an example. Since they started in the late 1 950 s,
they have been a primary producer of surface ship ASW combat systems. They
had a series of programs, and as one program of RDT&E geared down, another
one would start. They were able to maintain a demand for quality engineers, not
just production engineers, but R&D engineers, over a period of 30 years, because
they kept having programs that followed, more or less, heel to toe. Prior to
competition, the government and GE came up with a tremendously effective and
useful algorithm for automatic detection and classification of acoustic signatures.
We tested it in 1982 and it really worked. We got the IBM people and the
Raytheon people, and we ran them all up to GE to brief them on this new
algorithm, which was developed by GE, so we could have it applied in submarine
combat systems and in torpedoes, because it was very important. Those things,
ladies and gentleman, do not happen today. Today, every one of our prime
manufacturers is sitting there hiding what he's doing. You go to an NSIA or ADPA
meeting and, unlike before, no one stands up and tells what marvelous new thing
that they have developed in their company which could be applicable elsewhere,
because of the fear of competition and the fact that your partner in this
procurement is your competitor in the next procurement. We are
compartmentizing very much to the point where there is no information flow. Most
of these meetings now have gotten to the point where industry doesn t even send
engineers anymore; they send the marketeers to these meetings. It used to be
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engineers exchanging technical information to the benefit of all the companies
involved and to the benefit of the government. So is this a down side? Yes, I
think it is. I think it's a clear down side. I think there was certainly an up side to
not having this mix-and-match that we currently have. You can find that in every
one of your major contracts today, where, for example, you II see Raytheon lined
up next to GE and IBM, and on the next contract they're competitors. That does
not enhance communication or cooperation between the groups. There 's another
thing that happens when you get this teaming effort, especially when you are a
potential competitor. You have no vested interest in the prime being successful,
if you are a small piece of the contract. As a minor team member you are,
perhaps, on a fixed price contract, you Ye doing one box or two boxes; you're
doing a series of algorithms and now the prime is going to integrate it and make
it into a system that he's selling. He's making more money than you are, but
you "re going to compete with him for that same system two years from now. Are
you really interested in his success? I submit that you are not. That situation is
to the detriment of the government, because our contractors have to be interested
in successful applications of their products and they are not in this mix and match
situation. And, no, I dont have a solution.
MCNICOL: Let me try to put a cost analysis spin on the question, if I can. I think it's a critical
question and it's one that IVe not heard addressed in the cost community. You
can env.sion the two polar cases. One is where you dual-source late. That's a
situation where an item has already gone into production, or nearly into
production, and you bring on a change in the acquisition strategy, a second
source. That is in contrast to a case where you deliberately begin dual-sourcing,
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perhaps as early as milestone one, as part of the acquisition strategy. Now if you
take that late dual sourcing case, the obvious question, I think, for a cost analyst
to ask, is why would dual-sourcing save you any money? Is the answer that the
savings will come out of fee? Or will the savings come out of firing engineers?
The latter may save you some money, but it's also likely to reduce the quality of
the product DoD gets. Or do "savings" come from shifting engineers from one
contract to another, with no net savings to the government at all. Those questions
might lead you to say, "Aha, if I'm really going to do dual-sourcing and get some
benefits out of it, I ought to do it early, because that's the point where the real
decisions are made on the design of the item and on manufacturing, and there is
flexibility there to get cost savings that are more substantial than moving engineers
from one contract to another." That's on the one hand. On the other hand, it's a
little hard for me to tell a story about two firms who are going to cooperate closely
for six or eight years in full scale development and then, when somebody blows
the whistle, all of a sudden become fierce competitors. Yet, that's essentially what
we're asked to believe about how early dual sourcing works. I dont have a
resolution to these sets of questions. My point is that these are real questions that
the cost community ought to address. We ought to have positions based on
analysis and data as to the different effects on costs that we can anticipate from
early and late dual-sourcing.
I "dont have anything to offer that would help. However, I think that really gets
back to what RADM Carlson said about the old baronies. You know, in many
ways, we now call that kind of behavior total quality management. The Japanese,
from whom we 're learning how to build cars, don t focus on price. They focus on
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quality and reliability. That really was the touchstone of the way we ran the
defense business in the 1 960 s and 1 970 's. It 's really in the 1 980 's when we have
embraced these very aggressive procedures. It has become a political ethic to
force competition, the Compeition In Contracting Act, etc. This very much cuts
against the grain, in my view, of the new trend toward total quality management,
of managing to procure quality and value, and not necessarily obtaining the lowest
price. We are preoccupied in Congress with price, and I think we have to change
our cultural thinking on the Hill about that. It's not just trying to find the lowest
price right now, but the best value over time.
NUSSBAUM: Actually that leads into the question of whether economic goals are the most
important goals in dual sourcing and competition. Is it the money and profit, the
economic goals, that are at stake, or are there other goals at stake from our
perspective and from the perspective of the producers?
HAMRE: Let me make just a very brief comment from the very superficial level that I have
when looking at it from the Hill. While price is almost always the selling point for
competition, I believe the greatest benefits almost invariably appear elsewhere.
Seeking a second source producer of Phoenix missiles was pursued primarily to
free the Navy from depending exclusively on Hughes, for example. That's really
what was behind the Phoenix competition, and I think there's something important
to be said about that. While we Ve departed from the notion of baronies providing
quality over time, industry has changed during this period as well. Finance and
accounting guys have taken control of corporations, and they Ve looking for short-
term profits. The change that's going on in the industry has forced them to be a
little bit more aggressive and less generous in sharing this technology and
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expertise to the best value of the government. In other words, we get gouged a
lot of times by companies when they've got a monopoly, so we enter into
uneconomical competitions to get away from that. I really think we need a more
mature relationship between business and government. I think we all have to step
back from our six-month profit maximization syndrome, or political maximization
syndrome on the Hill, to a view that it's a much longer term relationship. I think
that's a more important kind of cultural change. Again, how well do that, I dont
know. We certainly should start on the Hill.
CARLSON: Let me give you an example of the dichotomy we have here. I wasn t making an
argument for or against competition before; I was telling you some of the down
side of it. There are definitely up sides. Some of the things we get out of
competition and dual-sourcing that we wouldn t have otherwise are the benefits of
competition; whether it's price or not, we could argue that. This is especially true
when you get to the point where there's no swing quantity; you get down to the
bare survival level for two companies, and you promise them that you 're going to
keep them both alive. Dr. McNicol brought that up before. However, you can end
up in a bidding war where two guys are arguing over who's going to get the
highest price, because they want to make the most money on the least quantity.
YouVe got to protect against that, and there are schemes for protecting against
that. But you do have competition. You do have additional qualified vendors.
Now an additional qualified vendor c>uld be very important, especially in the case
of labor unrest or in case of a natural disaster. We Ve had explosives plants that
have blown up in the last two years. If you have only one source and then all of
a sudden it's dust, you have a problem. Competition does enhance the
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mobilization base. Now mobilization is something that we dont think about very
often. We talk about the next war will be a come-as-you-are war, etc., and we
shouldnt worry about mobilization. Well, that's a very long walk on a short pier,
because if you're wrong and you have no mobilization base, it will be a short war,
I guarantee you. You may not be on the winning side, though.
MCNICOL: Let me return to the early versus late dual-sourcing question. It seems to be a
very wide consensus that dual-sourcing is definitely something program managers
would like to have in their pocket, and that ought to be in our arsenal to use.
From that point of view, dual-sourcing does not present any deep questions. We
would want to use it when we have troubles of one sort or another, and the issue
would be, "Is the price that we're paying worth the trouble that we're curing?" It
seerr/w to me that the much harder question is dual-sourcing early as a deliberate
acquisition strategy, one used when DoD is trying to get a break on price and
other considerations really don t play. If that s what we 're interested in, we Ve got
to st?od up to the question of "Are we willing to do whai's necessary to get
competition9 " I think Dr. Hamre quite rightly points out that this then leads to the
question, "Are we willing to lock ourselves into an acquisition strategy over time
that really brings those benefits to pass?" Is that a lead-in to the last question,
"What's the future of second-sourcing?"
NUSSBAUM: Yes! What's the future of second sourcing in DoD? With projected cuts in
quantity, are we returning to an era of sole-source procurement?
CARLSON: Well, let me make a comment on that. There has been this veiled idea of
uncertainty that we keep bringing up. We need to know the future of second
sourcing in advance because strategies have inertia. This uncertainty all points to
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my left and to Dr. McNicol's right, to the representative of the Congress. We in
DoD are not our own masters. When the Executive Branch comes forward with
a strategy, whereby we have determined that there are some things that we can
live without perhaps, we find that one branch of the legislative portion of the
government has determined that some other things are more important. Not, I 'd
like to point out, the branch that Dr. Hamre is representing here! But we are not
our own masters and we do have to obey the will of Congress.
HAMRE: Gee, what an introduction! I'm not going to make excuses for Congress as an
institution. I think we in Congress are absolutely preoccupied with an awful lot of
trivia. Who cares if we buy 15 or 16 of some system in one year? You wouldn't
believe how we fight over these trivial issues. We go through all kinds of
machinations to decide whether well have round or square chaff dispensers on
aircraft. The primary reason that this happens, of course, is because contractors
come to their representatives and get them to be their front men for a battle in
Congress that they lost in the Pentagon. So Congress does a lot of violence to
the defense budget. But not to make excuses for the Congress, a lot of
Congressional micromanagement occurs because decisions didn t get finally and
fairly resolved within DoD, as they should have. My personal view is that Congress
will invariably improve a good budget submission and it will always worsen a bad
one. That's a basic problem, and Ml get fired if anybody in this room quotes me,
so I'm counting on your generosity! We're just not an institution that's going to
improve faulty products that come over, because all of the people that were
battling it out inside the Pentagon and didnt resolve the dispute will simply get
people on the Hill to continue their side in this pitched battle. It really does help
107
if we get a good product to begin with. That's the first comment. The second
comment is that there has been great uncertainty within the Department of Defense
over the last five years. The uncertainties stem from the Department forecasting
unrealistically high growth patterns in the Services ' budget and Congress refusing
to guarantee stable funding patterns longer than one year. Both Congress and
the Administration are culprits in this. In the Weinberger era we would get these
budgets projecting incredible growth rates in the outyears. For fiscal year 90, the
original Weinberger FYDP was over $475 billion, and we Ye going to be at $300
billion. You dont have forecasts like that, with all the detailed planning that goes
into them, and then have to cut them back without having enormous inefficiencies.
Congress is equally to blame because it would adopt a budget resolution one year
and then rebase it in following years at a lower level. And, so, it's this dialectic
between the two bodies that has been the primary contributor to this terrible
instability in the acquisition process. I share your frustration that Congress has
tended to legislate some minor items, such as breaking out spare parts, etc., and
nobody's focusing on the major acquisition issues. As an institution, we do tend
to shoot the wounded. Hence, I 'm willing to accept your criticism of Congress in
this regard. But all of that is preamble to what I did want to say, which is by and
large, Congress has agreed to your acquisition strategies. We agreed to the
Phoenix dual-sourcing, and we're going to agree to its termination. We agreed to
multi-year contracts on the LHD s, and we agreed to the competition on every one
of the missile programs. We basically accept your acquisition strategy, whatever
it is. But all of us have to have the maturity to realize that ultimately we all work for
the same client, the same sponsor, and that's the taxpayer. It's not a tug of war
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where DoD is on one side of the rope, and Congress is on the other. We are ail-
both DoD and Congress-on the same side of the rope, and we're trying to win
against somebody else, such as the Soviet Union. I personally think Congress will
accept any solid acquisition strategy. There's not an a priori right or wrong
approach; I really believe that. If DoD comes over, cogently explains its plans, and
your analysis supports the recommendations, Congress is going to accept your
proposal. By and large, you're going to get 97% of what you ask for. So, that's
my feeble defense of the greatest institution on the face of the earth.
NUSSBAUM: It didnt sound feeble to me. We're nearing the end. Last call for rebuttals.
MCNICOL: I d like to make an observation that may be particularly important for cost analysts.
It seems that we've got three facts having to do with the work the cost community
does on dual sourcing. First, the current acquisition statues put a heavy
predisposition in favor of dual sourcing. Second, there seems to be in the
Congress, in the Executive Branch, and in the public at large a growing skepticism
about dual sourcing. Third, there may be some reluctance on the part of the
Defense Department to use the provisions that are in the law to request a waiver
from the dual-sourcing requirement. My guess is that Congress is not going to
change the law. Hence, the cost community is going to find itself under increasing
pressure to provide sharp analyses of the economics of dual sourcing as the
bases for requests that we don t engage in dual sourcing for particular programs.
CARLSON: I d like to add my "Yes" to that, especially for people down in the trenches who are
designing these acquisition strategies and acquisition plans. We need to be able
to use a decent model, as opposed to fear and superstition, in order to come up
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with a reasonable economic analysis that can stand the tests that have just been
mentioned by both the other speakers. There is a continual test of rationality as
a program goes through the budget process and becomes a part of the
President's budget. Also, what happens when it gets over on the Hill? We have
to start with something that is cogent and reasonable with a firm analytical basis.
In the past I dont think weVe had that. There are lots of systems that weve
second sourced without a firm analytical basis. We need to go back to those
things that we actually have data on, recognize the assumptions we made,
revalidate those assumptions, apply the data we have now that all the claims are
in, and see if dual sourcing was, in fact, economic. We can identify those
characteristics that you, as cost analysts, can capitalize on and project into the
future, so that we have a reasonable, economic basis. I guarantee you that we did
not have that in the past.
NUSSBAUM: Gentlemen, this is where I put my hat on as the timekeeper, but also on behalf of
the assembled cost analysts at the Twenty-Third Annual Department of Defense
Cost Analysis Symposium, I want to thank you for the insights on these very
vexing problems which are slightly less vexing now that weVe heard your views.
I appreciate it, and I hope everybody joins me in showing their appreciation.
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